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TO MAKE OR TO MAR1:  THE SUPREME COURT 
TURNS AWAY ANOTHER SECURITIES LAW 
PLAINTIFF 
James D. Redwood* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 13, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.
2
  Dutifully turning 
away another plaintiff in a securities fraud case,
3
 the Court held that the 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Albany Law School; B.A., 1971, Oberlin College; J.D., 1983, 
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  The author would like to thank his research assistants, 
Elie Salamon and Michael Lopes, for their invaluable assistance with this article. 
 1. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (OED) 1701 (1st ed. 1933) (stating that to make or to 
mar is “to cause either the complete success or ruin of (a person or thing)”). 
 2. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 3. In what has become a drearily-familiar scenario in recent years, the Court has 
generally cut back on the availability of implied private rights of action under the federal 
securities laws, particularly under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).  See, e.g., 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (denying 
recovery against customers and suppliers of a corporation issuing misleading statements 
because of a lack of reliance by the public on the conduct of secondary parties); Tellabs, Inc. 
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (holding that plaintiff must plead a 
“strong inference” of scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); Dura 
Pharm., Inc. v. Michael Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (holding that “alleging that a 
security’s price at the time of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation” is 
insufficient to “allege and prove ‘loss causation’” under 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4)); Cent. 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that “[a] 
private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under [section] 10(b)” or Rule 
10b-5); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that a plaintiff cannot 
recover under section 10(b) absent a showing of manipulation or deception); Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (holding that a plaintiff cannot recover under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 absent a showing that defendant acted with scienter); Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs who are not 
actually purchasers or sellers of a security lack standing to sue under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5). 
  Two other cases decided by the Court during the 2010–2011 Term, Matrixx 
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011), and Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. 
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011), do not alter the general movement away from 
expanding the rights of securities plaintiffs.  Admittedly, in Matrixx the Court found that the 
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“maker” of a statement, for the purposes of Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rule 10b-5,
4
 is limited to “the person or entity with ultimate 
 
plaintiff had sufficiently pled the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 element of materiality to survive 
a motion to dismiss.  Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1313.  Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the 
defendant pharmaceutical company had failed to disclose adverse events reports concerning 
one of the defendant’s products, notwithstanding the fact that those reports did not reveal a 
“statistically significant number of adverse events.”  Id.  Matrixx achieves its significance 
from the fact that the Court has consistently viewed the highly fact-specific materiality 
inquiry as particularly resistant to a decision on the pleadings or by way of summary 
judgment.  See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (noting that 
“the underlying objective facts . . . are merely the starting point for the ultimate 
determination of materiality” and observing that assessing materiality “requires delicate 
assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set of 
facts and the significance of those inferences to him, and these assessments are peculiarly 
ones for the trier of fact.”).  Only where reasonable minds could not differ on the question of 
materiality was a decision on the issue by summary judgment appropriate.  Id. at 450.   
  Matrixx followed another of the Court’s materiality precedents, Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), by citing with approval the Court’s concern that “[a]ny 
approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently 
fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or 
underinclusive.”  Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1318 (quoting Levinson, 485 U.S. at 236).  Far from 
broadening plaintiffs’ overall section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 rights and remedies, Matrixx speaks 
only to the element of materiality.  More narrowly, it expresses merely the Court’s 
reluctance to adopt the defendants’ bright-line, categorical rule that would consider adverse 
events reports to be material only if they disclosed a statistically significant number of such 
events.  Id. at 1319.  The case says nothing about any of the other elements of the Rule 10b-
5 cause of action, including the one at issue in Janus:  whether the defendant had “made” an 
untrue statement of material fact under Rule 10b-5(b). 
  Neither does the other recent securities case decided by the Court, Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).  In that case, the Court distinguished 
between the Rule 10b-5 elements of reliance and causation, and pointed out that although a 
plaintiff may invoke the rebuttable fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance to show that 
common questions of law and fact predominate over individual ones, thereby allowing the 
plaintiff to defeat attempts by defendant to deny certification of a class, the plaintiff is not 
required to prove loss causation at the class certification stage.  Id. at 2184–87.  But the 
Court was careful to point out that its decision was limited solely to the issue of what the 
plaintiff must show at the class certification stage and that its ruling went no further.  Chief 
Justice Roberts noted succinctly at the very beginning of his opinion that “[t]o prevail on the 
merits in a private securities fraud action, investors must demonstrate that the defendant’s 
deceptive conduct caused their claimed economic loss.”  Id. at 2183.  Far from easing the 
ultimate prima facie burden on the plaintiffs, Erica P. John Fund simply clarified the 
requirements that must be met at the certification stage.  Plaintiffs must still prove loss 
causation to prevail at trial. 
  A refreshing and rare recent example where the Court has apparently liberalized the 
implied private right of action is SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002), where the Court 
read the “in connection with” requirement of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 quite broadly.  
Zandford, however, may perhaps best be considered as the exception that proves the rule.  
The section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 remedy is rapidly shrinking and is likely to continue doing so. 
 4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010): 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
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authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”
5
  In the Court’s view, anyone other than the person with 
such authority or control may be able to “suggest what to say,” but is not an 
actual maker of the statement in question.
6
  Apparently, then, there is one, 
and only one, potential maker of a statement.  The concept of multiple 
makers or co-makers is foreign to the federal securities laws. 
The Janus case involved misleading statements in the prospectuses 
issued by a group of mutual funds with respect to the funds’ policies on 
“market timing.”
7
  The plaintiffs argued that, in fact, it was the investment 
adviser to the funds, not merely the funds themselves, which “made” the 
misrepresentations about market timing.
8
  The plaintiffs based their claim 
largely on the close relationship between the funds and the adviser and the 
intimate involvement of the adviser in the management of the funds.
9
  
Nonetheless, the Court noted that the funds and the advisers were separate 
business entities which operated largely independently of each other, and 
that all relevant corporate formalities were observed in the establishment 
and running of the funds and in the conduct of the advisory side of the 
business.
10
  The Court thus declined to “disregard the corporate form.”
11
 
The Court’s decision in the Janus case is troubling on a number of 
fronts.  First, it stands the traditional method of statutory analysis—by 
which one starts with the language of the statute and then proceeds to 
 
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 5. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 2300 n.1 (describing “market timing” as a trading strategy that allows short-
term traders with informational advantages about the true value of a security (in this case, 
mutual fund shares) that are not possessed by, or shared with, other, long-term fund 
investors to reap profits at the expense of the fund and the long-term investors).  See infra 
note 28. 
 8. Id. at 2300–01.  For simplicity, this article generally refers to First Derivative 
Traders as “plaintiffs” or “respondents,” rather than as “plaintiff” or “respondent.”  This is 
because “First Derivative Traders . . . represents a class of plaintiffs who owned JCG stock 
as of September 3, 2003.”  Id. at 2300. 
 9. Id. at 2304. 
 10. Id. at 2299, 2304.  The Court was equally unswayed by the fact that a third entity, 
Janus Capital Group Inc., had created the funds and established the investment adviser firm, 
Janus Capital Management LLC, as its wholly-owned subsidiary.  In the Court’s view the 
businesses were still independent.  Id. 
 11. Id.  
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analyze, in descending order, the legislative history, statutory scheme, and 
lastly, policy considerations
12
—on its head.  In this author’s view, the 
Court’s holding is based on raw policy and little else.  The Court makes 
much of the fact that “in analyzing whether JCM ‘made’ the statements for 
purposes of Rule 10b-5,
13
 we are mindful that we must give ‘narrow 
dimensions . . . to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first 
enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.’”
14
  Yet 
notwithstanding the Court’s use of the word “must,” nothing in the law 
compelled the Court to give a narrow reading to Rule 10b-5.  The Court, 
following a disturbing recent trend,
15
 has voluntarily chosen to bar the gates 
to securities plaintiffs, despite the fact that the language of Rule 10b-5 and 
the definition of the word “make” did not by any means require such a 
decision. 
Additionally, even if one focuses solely on the Oxford English 
Dictionary, it is evident that a multitude of definitions of the verb “to 
make” was available to the Court.  Many of these definitions would have 
supported the plaintiffs in their efforts to hold JCM liable as a “maker” of 
the fund prospectus misstatements in question.  But again, instead of 
actually utilizing any of the available definitions, the Court chose to 
superimpose a test of “ultimate authority” or “control” onto the meaning of 
the word “make,” without citing to any authority whatsoever to support its 
position.  In this author’s opinion, a better method of determining what a 
word actually means is by using—not avoiding—the dictionary.
16
  For 
some reason, however, with one notable and peculiar exception analyzed 
below,
17
 the Court was reluctant to do this.  One suspects that it was 
because the Court would not have liked what it might find had it delved 
farther into the realm of word meaning than it was willing to go. 
 
 12. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685, 694 (1985); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197, 201, 206 (1976). 
 13. The Court chose to ground its analysis on Rule 10b-5 rather than on section 10(b), 
which is the normal approach.  See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 (noting that Rule 
10b-5 may not exceed “the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10(b)”); see 
also discussion infra Part III.A. 
 14. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008)). 
 15. See cases cited supra note 3. 
 16. Black’s Law Dictionary lends its support to an expansive definition of the verb “to 
make.”  See infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text (consulting Black’s Law Dictionary 
and Greek epics to wax poetic on the definition of “to make”).  It should also be noted that 
Black’s Law Dictionary does not contain anything approximating the “ultimate authority” 
test crafted by the Court. 
 17. See infra notes 185–98 and accompanying text (referring to the Oxford English 
Dictionary to suggest alternative interpretations of the word “make” to the definition the 
Supreme Court settled upon in Janus, as appropriate substitutes for the ultimate authority 
test which the Court introduced without citing to any authority). 
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Finally, the Court’s reliance on the separate entity/corporate 
formalities issue seems misplaced.  Without explicitly saying so, the Court 
apparently felt that the distinct entity status of the Janus businesses would 
have shielded the investment adviser from liability for the funds’ 
misstatements had the plaintiff tried to pursue some analogue to the 
“piercing the corporate veil” theory, which it did not.
18
  Yet, even if it were 
true that the separateness of JCM and the funds might defeat attempts to 
pierce the veil on a “single economic entity,” “alter ego,” “instrumentality,” 
or “identity” theory, the whole premise of the plaintiff’s case was 
(securities) fraud, and the fact of separate entity status will not protect 
affiliated business enterprises that engage in fraud.
19
  The Court ignored 
this important distinction in its enthusiasm over the fact that JCM and the 
funds had met all the requisites for adhering to the corporate form.  Such 
fastidiousness is irrelevant in the presence of fraud. 
Part II of this article discusses the Janus case as it made its way up the 
federal court system.  This Part zeroes in on the judgment for the 
defendants by the District Court for the District of Maryland, the reversal 
of that court’s decision by the Fourth Circuit, and the subsequent reversal 
of the appellate decision by the Supreme Court.  This Part goes on to 
suggest some alternative readings of “make” that would have easily and 
logically comported with the position espoused by the plaintiffs.  Part III 
starts by analyzing the Supreme Court’s discussion of the meaning of the 
word “to make,” and criticizes the narrow test which the Court used in 
place of an actual definition.  Part III continues by analyzing the 
significance the Court placed on the separate entity status of the various 
entities involved and argues that that significance was overstated and failed 
to account for the fraud-based nature of the plaintiff’s complaint.  Part III 
concludes with a return to the issue of who is a “maker.”  Meeting the 
Court on its own ground, that part suggests that if a test rather than a 
definition is in order, a workable test along the lines of two venerable 
Supreme Court precedents, Dirks v. SEC
20
 and Pinter v. Dahl,
21
 provides 
the proper framework for determining who, in reality, “makes” untrue 
statements of material fact.  Finally, Part IV closes with a brief lament over 
the future of the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.  Perhaps this last part should be characterized as more of a 
wake than a lament, as the Court seems wedded to a course that will most 
 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the meaning of the phrase “to use or 
employ” in the context of Rule 10b-5). 
 19. See id. (more discussion of the operation of the phrase “to use or employ” on the 
contours of a 10b-5 action). 
 20. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 21. 486 U.S. 622 (1988). 
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likely push the statutory and administrative remedy into an irreversible 
coma. 
II.  THE CASE 
The Janus case involved a number of related entities:  Janus Capital 
Group, Inc. (hereinafter “JCG”), Janus Capital Management LLC 
(hereinafter “JCM”), and various mutual funds created by JCG and 
collectively referred to as the Janus Investment Fund or “JIF.”
22
  JCG was a 
publicly traded corporation; JCM, an investment adviser firm which 
managed the funds, was JCG’s wholly-owned subsidiary; and JIF was 
organized as a Massachusetts Business Trust.
23
  At issue in the case was the 
extent to which JCM was liable for certain allegedly material 
misstatements in fund prospectuses issued by JIF,
24
 based in large part on 
the close connection between JCM and JIF and JCM’s role in providing 
advisory and management services to the funds.
25
  The Supreme Court held 
that “JCM cannot be held liable because it did not make the statements in 
the prospectuses.”
26
 
A.  Lower Court Opinions 
In the Janus case,
27
 plaintiffs, the purchasers of JCG stock, alleged 
that the defendants, JCG and JCM, falsely stated in JIF-issued prospectuses 
 
 22. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct 2296, 2299 (2011). 
 23. Id.  A “Massachusetts Business Trust” is “a form of business organization, similar 
to a corporation, in which investors receive transferable certificates of beneficial interest 
(instead of stock shares).”  A HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS LAW TERMS 610 (Bryan A. Garner 
ed., 1999). 
 24. Janus, 131 S. Ct at 2299. 
 25. The parties disputed the extent to which the mutual funds were actually run, 
managed, or controlled by JCM.  See Brief for Petitioners at 3–4, Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. 
First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 3501188, at *3–4 
(specifying that “JCG is a publicly traded financial services company; JCM is a subsidiary 
of JCG that provides investment advisory and administrative services to mutual funds, 
including series of Janus Investment Fund—a separate legal entity that is not owned, 
governed, or controlled by JCG or JCM.”); Brief for Respondent at 4, Janus Capital Grp. 
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4253501, at 
*4 (describing a “coordinated marketing strategy that blurred the distinction between the 
entities that constituted JCG’s business, so that investors perceived a unified Janus brand.”). 
 26. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299. 
 27. See Wiggins v. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. (In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.), 487 F. Supp. 
2d 618, 620 (D. Md. 2007) (alleging that defendants ostensibly prohibited market timing in 
their funds while allowing hedge funds to transact in this manner), rev’d, 566 F.3d 111 (4th 
Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).  The district court in Maryland 
had already considered matters unrelated to this article in an earlier decision, Wiggins v. 
Janus Capital Grp. Inc. (In re Mut. Funds Inv. Lit.), 384 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Md. 2005). 
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that they prohibited the practice known as “market timing”
28
 in the mutual 
funds.  In reality, the defendants permitted certain favored hedge fund 
clients to engage in that practice pursuant to secret arrangements with those 
hedge funds.
29
  According to the complaint, the misstatements about market 
timing in the JIF prospectuses “fraudulently induced investors [other than 
plaintiffs] to buy shares in the Janus funds.”
30
  Plaintiffs then theorized that 
the misleading impression about market timing created by these false 
disclosures caused more trading to occur in the funds than would otherwise 
have been the case, and that as a result, JCM enjoyed deceptively large 
increases in its management fees.
31
  Critically, some ninety percent of 
JCG’s income was derived from JCM’s revenues.
32
  The misstatements 
about market timing became public knowledge when details of the New 
York Attorney General’s investigation of the Janus entities were disclosed, 
and shortly thereafter, “massive withdrawals or redemption of [the mutual] 
fund securities were triggered.  The assets under management by JCM 
decreased by $14 billion,”
33
 and the resulting “crisis of confidence” among 
JCG shareholders and the subsequent sell-off of JCG stock caused that 
stock to decline in value by twenty-three percent, to the injury of the 
plaintiffs.
34
  The plaintiffs thereafter sued both JCG and JCM, arguing that 
 
 28. Simply stated, market timing is a process whereby certain investors exploit 
informational disparities in the pricing of largely foreign securities based on events that 
occur between the time that trading in those securities’ primary markets closes and the 
subsequent close of trading in the United States.  For further discussion of the practice, see 
In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 116 and Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300 n.1.  What is 
important for present purposes are not the mechanics of market timing, but rather the fact 
that although in Janus the practice worked to the advantage of the privileged, short-term 
traders in the funds (the hedge funds), it operated to the disadvantage of long-term investors 
in JIF.  In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 116. 
 29. Id.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 6–7 (explaining that the motivation 
for JCM and JCG’s allowing the hedge funds to engage in market timing was that, in return, 
the hedge funds apparently agreed to invest in other investment vehicles managed by JCM).  
See also In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 118 (explaining that the “secret 
arrangements” between JCM and the hedge funds came to light as a result of an 
investigation by the New York Attorney General’s Office, whose “complaint made public 
the actions taken by JCG and JCM’s executives to permit substantial market timing contrary 
to the Janus funds’ expressed policies . . . .”); Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300 n.2 (indicating that 
JCG and JCM ultimately settled the state action and “agreed to reduce their fees by $125 
million and pay $50 million in civil penalties and $50 million in disgorgement to the mutual 
fund investors.”). 
 30. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 118.  One problem faced by the plaintiffs 
in the Janus action was, of course, the fact that they purchased shares in JCG, not in the 
mutual funds themselves.  Id.  This posed an obstacle in the view of the district court, but is 
otherwise beyond the scope of this article.  See infra notes 46–50 and accompanying text 
(discussing the district court’s reading of the requirements of a 10b-5 action).  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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they had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
35
 
and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.
36
  The plaintiffs also 
included a “control person” claim against JCG under Securities Exchange 
Act section 20(a).
37
 
1.  The District Court 
The District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the 
complaint.
38
  That court, focusing initially on JCG’s potential liability, first 
noted that the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that private parties may 
sue defendants for aiding-and-abetting under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5,
39
 and that plaintiffs can only prevail where they can show that defendants 
engaged in a primary violation of the statute and rule by “making” a 
misrepresentation or omission that was directly attributable to them.
40
  The 
court found the complaint deficient in that regard, pointing out that it 
contained “no allegations that JCG actually made or prepared the 
prospectuses, let alone that any statements contained therein were directly 
attributable to it.”
41
  Furthermore, although the court accepted for purposes 
of discussion the plaintiff’s argument that JCG was involved in the 
dissemination of the fund prospectuses, it found that mere dissemination or 
distribution of false and misleading statements made by others is an 
insufficient basis for the imposition of Rule 10b-5 liability.
42
  Importantly, 
the court noted that, with the possible exception of underwriters, “all other 
participants in securities offerings must literally make the allegedly false 
statements in order to be liable under Rule 10b-5.”
43
  Since the plaintiffs 
failed to allege that JCG had made any of the misleading statements in the 
fund prospectuses, plaintiffs could not hold JCG liable.
44
 
 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2007).  For the relevant text of Section 10(b), see infra note 112 
and accompanying discussion. 
 36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).  For the relevant text of Rule 10b-5, see infra note 
177 and accompanying discussion. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2007).  See Janus Capital Grp, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 
131 S. Ct 2296, 2301 n.5 (2011).  The section 20(a) claim is beyond the scope of this article.  
In any event, the Supreme Court noted that the section 20(a) claim was dependent on 
whether the plaintiffs could successfully assert a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
against JCM.  Id.  Once the Court decided that plaintiffs’ claim against JCM had failed, the 
control person claim failed along with it.  Id. at 2305. 
 38. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624 (D. Md. 2007), rev’d, 566 
F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom.  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2296. 
 39. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). 
 40. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at 622. 
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As to JCM, the district court dismissed the complaint on another basis, 
namely the failure by the plaintiffs to meet the “in connection with” 
requirement for bringing a section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 action.
45
  The 
plaintiffs’ weakness in this regard stemmed from the fact that they had not 
purchased stock in the companies that were the subject of the false and 
misleading prospectuses, namely the mutual funds.  Instead, they had 
purchased stock in JCG, as to which there were no misstatements or 
omissions:  “there is no nexus between plaintiffs, as JCG shareholders, and 
JCM, the funds’ investment adviser.”
46
  The court felt that there were two 
problems with plaintiffs’ status as JCG shareholders.  First, JCM, while it 
might owe a duty to shareholders in the mutual funds not to make
47
 
misstatements in the mutual fund prospectuses, did not owe any such duty 
to the shareholders of the completely separate entity that had created and 
organized the mutual funds, JCG.
48
  Second, because the misrepresentations 
in question did not concern the securities that plaintiffs actually purchased, 
those misstatements could not be considered “in connection with” a 
purchase of securities actually made by the plaintiffs.
49
  As a result, the 
district court held that “a mutual fund investment adviser that allegedly 
made misrepresentations to mutual fund shareholders cannot be liable 
under section 10(b) to its parent’s shareholders who purchased no mutual 
fund shares.”
50
 
 
 45. Id. at 622–24.  The standard elements of a Rule 10b-5 action were stated by the 
Supreme Court in Janus as follows:  “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the 
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the 
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) 
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”  Janus Capital Grp, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 
131 S. Ct 2296, 2301 n.3 (2011) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 
U.S. 148, 157 (2008)). 
 46. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 623. 
 47. Because the district court found that plaintiffs’ claim against JCM failed to meet the 
“in connection with” requirement and the duty requirement, it held that it “need not decide 
whether JCM made the alleged misstatements upon which plaintiffs rely.”  Id. at 623 n.5. 
 48. Id. at 622–23.  Whether the court’s emphasis on duty, which is a requirement in an 
omissions case but not in a misrepresentations case like Janus, may have been misplaced, is 
beyond the scope of this article.  See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230–31 
(1980) (discussing the duty requirement in an omissions case). 
 49. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 622–23.  Again, the issue of 
whether the District Court properly read the “in connection with” requirement or properly 
construed cases such as Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000), is 
beyond the scope of this article.  For a broad reading of the “in connection with” 
requirement, see SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–25 (2002). 
 50. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 624. 
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2.  The Court of Appeals 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district 
court.
51
  After holding that the heightened pleading requirements of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
52
 only applied to the Rule 
10b-5 element of scienter, and that the general fraud pleading requirements 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applied to the other elements of a 
Rule 10b-5 case,
53
 the court held that the plaintiffs had adequately pled the 
element of reliance
54
 by demonstrating that the defendants, JCM and JCG, 
“made” the misrepresentations in the Janus fund prospectuses.
55
  The court 
observed that the “clear essence” of the complaint was to the effect that 
JCM and JCG “helped draft the misleading prospectuses”
56
 and that this 
sufficiently demonstrated that they had “made” the misleading statements 
on which plaintiffs grounded their claim.
57
  In addition, the court stated that 
the defendants could be deemed to have “made” the misrepresentations 
simply by having caused the prospectuses to be issued or disseminated, 
again disagreeing with the district court.
58
  The court of appeals thus 
concluded that “JCG and JCM, by participating in the writing and 
dissemination of the prospectuses, made the misleading statements 
contained in the documents.”
59
 
The court then turned to the issue of whether the misstatements in the 
prospectuses had to be attributed to the defendants in order for the plaintiff 
to be able to show the element of reliance.
60
  After discussing the circuit 
court split on this issue, the Fourth Circuit held that although attribution is 
required for reliance, a relaxed standard for demonstrating attribution 
applies at the pleading stage: 
[A] plaintiff can plead fraud-on-the-market reliance by alleging 
facts from which a court could plausibly infer that interested 
investors would have known that the defendant was responsible 
 
 51. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 131 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 
S. Ct. 3499 (2010), rev’d sub nom.  Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 
S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
 52. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995).  See infra note 298 (discussing the difference in standards). 
 53. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 119–20. 
 54. Id. at 120.  See also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–47 (1988) 
(discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory). 
 55. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 121. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  The court was impressed in this regard by plaintiffs’ allegations that JCM and 
JCG had made the prospectuses available to the public on a joint Janus website. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. 
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for the statement at the time it was made, even if the statement on 
its face is not directly attributed to the defendant.
61
 
The court found such an inference plausible on the facts before it, 
“based on JCM’s duties as investment advisor to the Janus funds, JCG’s 
role as an asset management firm and parent of JCM, and the two 
defendants’ active dissemination of the Janus fund prospectuses . . . .”
62
  
The interconnection among the various Janus entities demonstrated to the 
court’s satisfaction that “either or both defendants played a substantial role 
in drafting or approving the allegedly misleading prospectuses,”
63
 even 
absent a showing that their role was specifically called to the attention of 
investors in the mutual funds.  This “plausible inference” of attribution was 
sufficient. 
The court ultimately went on, however, to limit its attribution holding 
to JCM, and did not extend it to JCG.
64
  The court justified this distinction 
based on the fact that, while “an investment advisor is well known to be 
intimately involved in the day-to-day operations of the mutual funds it 
manages,”
65
 the same could not be said of an investment adviser’s parent 
company.  The fact that JCG sponsored a family of mutual funds was not 
an adequate reason to subject it to Rule 10b-5 liability.
66
  In the court’s 
view, although it might be true that JCG participated in dissemination of 
the misleading prospectuses, that alone did not meet the attribution 
requirement, which further required a showing that investors in the funds 
would have believed that JCG had also participated in the drafting or 
approval of the prospectuses in question.
67
 
 
 61. Id. at 124. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  The court later emphasized that the key to attribution, absent express language 
to that effect, lay in “the nature of the relationship between the defendants (JCG and JCM) 
and the Janus funds . . . .”  Id. at 125. 
 64. Id. at 127–28.  As to the investment adviser, the court held that “given the publicly 
disclosed responsibilities of JCM, interested investors would infer that JCM played a role in 
preparing or approving the content of the Janus fund prospectuses, particularly the content 
pertaining to the funds’ policies affecting the purchase or sale of [securities].”  Id. at 127.  
Among the (mis)stated policies “affecting the purchase or sale of [securities],” of course, 
was the policy regarding the funds’ supposed intolerance of market timing.  Id. 
 65. Id. at 128. 
 66. The court did, however, find JCG liable as a “control person” under section 20(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2007).  Id. at 129–31. 
 67. Id.  The court of appeals also considered issues of loss causation, scheme liability, 
and control person liability beyond the scope of this article.  Id. A concurring opinion by 
Judge Shedd found that the attribution requirement, which the majority found to have been 
met with respect to JCM but not to JCG, was also met as to the parent company.  Id. at 131–
32 (Shedd, J., concurring). 
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B.  The Supreme Court 
The Janus defendants who lost in the court of appeals timely filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.
68
  In the petition, JCM 
and JCG characterized the Fourth Circuit’s opinion as having held that an 
investment adviser who merely “helped” draft the misleading prospectuses 
of another company and “participat[ed]” in the writing and dissemination 
of those prospectuses could be held liable under Rule 10b-5.
69
  The 
questions presented in the writ were whether the Fourth Circuit erred in 
deciding that a “service provider”
70
 could be held primarily liable under 
Rule 10b-5 for “help[ing]” or “participating in” another company’s 
misstatements, and whether that court also erred by concluding that a 
“service provider can be held primarily liable in a private securities-fraud 
action for statements that were not directly and contemporaneously 
attributed to the service provider.”
71
 
The Supreme Court granted the petition on June 28, 2010.
72
  Oral 
argument took place on December 7, 2010, and the Court issued its opinion 
reversing the Fourth Circuit on June 13, 2011.
73
  The majority opinion was 
written by Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito.
74
  Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
75
 
1.  The Opinion of the Court 
The majority began its opinion by noting that although JCG had 
created both the Janus funds (JIF) and JCM, all of the entities in question 
had separate, distinct identities, and that, in particular, JCM’s independence 
from JIF exceeded what was demanded of an investment company under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940.
76
  The Court then recounted the facts 
 
 68. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. Oct. 30, 2009) (No. 09-525). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Use of the term “service provider” was clearly intended to encourage the Court to 
view JCM in the same light that it had viewed the “service providers,” Scientific-Atlanta 
and Motorola, in Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 71. Petition for Certiorari at i, Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. 
Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2009 WL 3614467. 
 72. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 130 S. Ct. 3499 (2010). 
 73. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305. 
 74. Id. at 2299. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  Section 10(a) of the Investment Company Act permits an investment company 
to have no more than sixty percent of its board made up of “interested persons,” which 
would include representatives of the investment adviser.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2007).  As 
the Court noted, only one member of JIF’s board was associated with JCM.  Janus, 131 S. 
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as found by the lower courts, including the fact that JIF had issued 
misleading prospectuses about its funds containing misrepresentations 
about the funds’ market timing policies.
77
  After then detailing the 
plaintiffs’ theory of recovery against JCM based on JCM’s alleged 
responsibility for the market timing disclosure deficiencies,
78
 the Court 
squarely and simply posed the issue as whether JCM had “made” the 
misstatements in the JIF prospectuses.
79
  The Court held that it had not.
80
 
The Court believed that there can only be one “maker” of a statement 
(or a misstatement):  “the person or entity with ultimate authority over the 
statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.”
81
  
The majority opinion held that without such control or authority, a person 
may be said to suggest a statement but cannot be deemed its “maker.”
82
  
The Court also implied, without specifically deciding the matter, that 
attribution was a prerequisite to determining who a statement’s “maker” 
is.
83
 
The Court then opined that expanding the definition of “maker” 
beyond persons with ultimate authority would be tantamount to overruling 
its earlier decisions in Central Bank,
84
 which abolished private aiding-and-
abetting liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and Stoneridge,
85
 
which held that customers/suppliers of a company that issued fraudulent 
financial statements to its shareholders were not liable to those 
shareholders, because those shareholders could not be said to have relied 
on any fraudulent conduct or speech on the part of the customers or 
suppliers.  The majority thus felt constrained to give a limited reading to 
the judicially-created, implied private right of action under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5,
86
 and it was clear that in its view the plaintiffs were merely 
engaged in an end-run around the restrictive holdings of the Court’s two 
earlier cases. 
After giving a narrow interpretation of what it means “to make” a 
misstatement, the Court then emphasized that, notwithstanding the close 
relationship between an investment adviser and the mutual funds which 
 
Ct. at 2299.  Notwithstanding this fact, it should be noted that all of the officers of JIF were 
also officers of JCM.  Id. 
 77. Id. at 2300. 
 78. Id. at 2300–01. 
 79. Id. at 2301. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 2302. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (stating that attribution is “strong evidence” of who is the only maker of a 
statement). 
 84. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 85. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 86. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303. 
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that adviser manages, in this case it was quite significant that all the 
requisite corporate formalities designed to ensure separate entity existence 
had been scrupulously followed by JCG, JCM, and JIF, and that as a result, 
grounds did not exist for “disregard[ing] the corporate form.”
87
  The 
majority noted that the obligation to file the prospectuses which were 
alleged to be misleading rested on JIF alone, not on JCM, and that there 
was no indication on the face of the prospectuses that any statements 
contained therein came from JCM rather than from JIF.
88
  Although the 
plaintiffs argued that JCM was “significantly involved in preparing the 
prospectuses,” the Court held that “this assistance, subject to the ultimate 
control of Janus Investment Fund, does not mean that JCM ‘made’ any 
statements in the prospectuses.”
89
  As a result, the majority concluded that 
JIF was the sole maker of the misstatements about market timing that 
appeared in the funds’ prospectuses and that the plaintiffs had therefore 
failed to prove the very first element of a Rule 10b-5 action against JCM, 
namely that it was the defendant who “made” those misstatements.
90
 
2.  The Dissent 
Justice Breyer’s dissent started out by emphasizing the intimate 
relationship among all the Janus entities.
91
  He pointed out that each of 
JIF’s officers was also an employee of JCM, and that JCM virtually ran JIF 
without any outside assistance.
92
  The dissent used this close connection to 
take issue with the majority’s cramped construction of the verb “make,” 
which Justice Breyer found unjustified as a definitional or legal matter.  He 
then went on to note that there may often be multiple “makers” of a 
statement, and that this was a situation where, given the close involvement 
of JCM in all of JIF’s affairs, it was eminently reasonable to hold JCM a 
 
 87. Id. at 2304. 
 88. Id. at 2304–05. 
 89. Id. at 2305. 
 90. Id.  The Court also refused to read the adverb “indirectly” in a broad manner, 
limiting it to the manner in which a statement is communicated.  In the Court’s view, the 
adverb sheds no light on who actually makes a statement.  Id. at 2305 n.11.  The Court also 
held that it was unnecessary for it to determine the contours of what it means to 
communicate a misstatement “indirectly” because none of the statements in the prospectuses 
was attributed to JCM, and thus JCM actually “made” none of the statements.  Id.  In the 
Court’s mind, “to find that a person or entity made a statement indirectly, . . . attribution is 
necessary.”  Id. (For a critique of the Court’s persistent failure to deal “directly” with the 
adverb “indirectly,” see infra text accompanying notes 109–38.). 
 91. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id.  JCM managed the “purchase, sale, redemption, and distribution” of JIF 
investments, and it “prepares, modifies, and implements the Janus Fund’s long-term 
strategies.  And [JCM], . . . through [its] employees, carries out the Fund’s daily activities.”  
Id. 
REDWOOD_FINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  2:57 PM 
2012] TO MAKE OR TO MAR 477 
 
“maker” of the JIF prospectus misstatements.
93
 
Justice Breyer also attacked the “ultimate authority” test crafted by the 
majority, observing that “[e]very day, hosts of corporate officials make 
statements with content that more senior officials or the board of directors 
have ‘ultimate authority’ to control,”
94
 yet nonetheless it was well 
recognized that these subordinate officials were at least a, if not the, maker 
of the statements in question.
95
  He added that “[p]ractical matters related to 
context, including control, participation, and relevant audience, help 
determine who ‘makes’ a statement and to whom that statement may 
properly be ‘attributed,’ . . . .”
96
  The dissent clearly felt that these 
“practical matters” weighed heavily in favor of finding JCM responsible as 
a “maker” of the misstatements in the prospectuses of the various funds it 
managed.
97
 
The dissent then concluded by reemphasizing the close and intimate 
relationship, not to say control relationship, which JCM had with JIF.
98
  
Pointing out that the Court, at least “sometimes,”
99
 has recognized that 
corporate officials can be held liable for misstatements made in a document 
(or by a third person) that the officials do not legally control, and that many 
lower courts have found actors without “ultimate authority” to be primarily 
liable for various misstatements,
100
 Justice Breyer argued that JCM fell well 
within these precedents.
101
  As he noted, “[t]he relationship between Janus 
Management [JCM] and the Fund [JIF] could hardly have been closer.  
Janus Management’s involvement in preparing and writing the relevant 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 2307. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Justice Breyer also stated that both Central Bank and Stoneridge were inapplicable 
to the facts at hand.  Central Bank involved the secondary liability of a bank which served 
as an indenture trustee, whereas in Janus the plaintiffs had proceeded against JCM on the 
basis of primary liability.  And in Stoneridge, there were no allegations that the “service 
providers” had made any misstatements that were communicated to the public.  In Janus, on 
the other hand, JCM had allegedly made misstatements about market timing that were 
disclosed to the marketplace and on which the plaintiffs arguably relied.  Id. at 2307–10.  
Justice Breyer went on to address the Section 20(a) control person claim, as well as 
problems of proof, which might have doomed an SEC action against JCM based on an 
aiding-and-abetting theory.  Id. at 2310–11.  Although Central Bank abolished private 
aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, after that case Congress 
quickly adopted Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2007), to give the 
Commission aiding-and-abetting authority.  These other issues, however, are beyond the 
scope of this article. 
 98. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2311–12. 
 99. Id. at 2311 (emphasis in original). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 2312. 
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statements could hardly have been greater.”
102
  As a result, the dissent 
determined that “[u]nless we adopt a formal rule . . . that would arbitrarily 
exclude from the scope of the word ‘make’ those who manage a firm . . . , 
the management company [JCM] at issue here falls within that scope.”
103
  
Unfortunately, in Justice Breyer’s view, the majority had adopted just such 
a formal and arbitrary rule, thereby working what he considered to be a 
clear injustice on deserving plaintiffs. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  English as she is spoke
104
 (“Words, words, words”
105
) 
1.  Section 10(b) 
It has to strike one as curious that the Supreme Court in Janus almost 
completely ignored the need to start with the statute, Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act,
106
 rather than with SEC Rule 10b-5.
107
  After all, this is the 
same Court that has chided the reader time and time again to begin with the 
statute rather than the rule,
108
 and that has more specifically pointed out that 
the express language of the statute, the legislative history, and the 
legislative scheme are the predominant factors to consider in any statutory 
analysis case, and that further, reliance on policy concerns should come 
last, not first.
109
  It is axiomatic that the SEC’s administrative mandate may 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. PEDRO CAROLINO, ENGLISH AS SHE IS SPOKE: OR, A JEST IN SOBER EARNEST  (1884).  
But see that authority of authorities, Wikipedia.org:  “English As She Is Spoke is the 
common name of a 19th century book written by Pedro Carolino and falsely credited to Jose 
da Fonseca.”  WIKIPEDIA, http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_As_She_Is_Spoke (last 
visited August 16, 2011). 
 105. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2. 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2007). 
 107. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 108. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (concerning a 
minority shareholder’s action opposing a merger under 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and the Commission’s Rule 10b-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 
(1976) (concerning an action against an accounting firm seeking recovery under 10(b) of the  
Exchange Act  and  Rule 10b-5). 
 109. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  As noted earlier, the proper approach to 
statutory analysis in the securities field has been stated perhaps most consistently in some of 
the opinions authored by Justice Lewis F. Powell (see, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. 
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (concerning sale of unregistered stock under the  Exchange 
Act  and Securities Act of 1933); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 185 (concerning an action 
against an accounting firm seeking recovery under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act  and  
Rule 10b-5).  One starts with the language of the particular statutory provision at issue, 
proceeds next to the legislative history of that provision, and then looks at the statutory 
scheme, those sections of the law which “surround,” “accompany,” or “complement” the 
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specific provision under consideration.  Only thereafter, and generally last rather than first 
(which is the reverse of what the Court did in Janus), does one proceed to consider policy 
concerns.  Interestingly, the Court in Central Bank, somewhat ironically, given the Janus 
Court’s strenuous efforts to use policy to keep that earlier case from being eroded, showed 
its disdain for policy matters rather pointedly:  “Policy considerations cannot override our 
interpretation of the text and structure of the [Exchange] Act, except to the extent that they 
may help to show that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result ‘so bizarre’ 
that Congress could not have intended it.”  Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994) (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 
(1991)).  It is the position of this author that the Court’s substitution of a policy-laden 
“ultimate authority” or “control” test for the text and structure of Rule 10b-5 was what was 
bizarre about the Janus opinion, not the language of the rule. 
  It should also be pointed out that Justice Clarence Thomas, who wrote the majority 
opinion in Janus, has not always elevated policy over statutory concerns.  In his cogent 
dissent in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561 (1995), Justice Thomas took the 
majority to task for having engaged in an essentially policy-driven approach, albeit masked 
as “statutory” analysis, when it decided the question of whether a privately-negotiated 
secondary market purchase agreement for the stock of a corporation was a “prospectus” for 
purposes of Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2007).  Id. at 
564.  In the majority opinion in Gustafson, Justice Kennedy, who authored Central Bank, by 
and large ignored the definitions section of the 1933 Act, which actually defined the term 
“prospectus,” preferring instead to employ the very limited meaning of the term as found in 
Section 10 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2007), which, in the Court’s words, describes a 
prospectus as “confined to documents related to public offerings by an issuer or its 
controlling shareholders.”  Id. at 569.  Although Justice Kennedy did later make reference to 
the definitions section, § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(10) (2007), he apparently felt that the 
restricted meaning of “prospectus” in Section 10 prevented the Court from giving the word 
the broader meaning clearly intended by Congress in the definitions section itself.  Id. at 
573–75.  This conclusion can only be explained by the Court’s having already decided, as a 
policy matter, that the rescissionary remedy contemplated by Section 12(a)(2) should not 
apply to privately negotiated, secondary market securities transactions.  It was certainly not 
justified by the language of the statute. 
  In his dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
made this very point.  Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  After repeating the old saw that 
“‘[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language 
itself,’” Justice Thomas stated that he “believe[d] that the proper method is to begin with the 
provision actually involved in this case, § 12[(a)](2), and then turn to the 1933 Act’s 
definitional section, § 2[(a)](10), before consulting the structure of the Act as a whole.”  Id. 
(quoting Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (quoting Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)).  He then 
went on candidly to opine that “[t]he majority’s analysis of § 12[(a)](2) is motivated by its 
policy preferences.”  Id. at 594.  Thus, although he pointed out that he shared “the 
majority’s concern that extending § 12[(a)](2) to secondary and private transactions might 
result in an unwanted increase in securities litigation,” the solution to this problem lay with 
Congress, the body charged with amending the statute, not with the Court.  Id.  The Court 
had no business substituting its policy preferences for the actual language used in the 
statute. 
  It is a pity, perhaps, that in Janus Justice Thomas saw fit to abandon his adherence 
to the language actually used by Congress in Section 10(b) or by the SEC in Rule 10b-5 and 
preferred instead to superimpose a policy-weighted “ultimate authority” or “control” test 
onto the plain meaning of the word “make.”  It is not a sufficient justification for this 
approach to say that the words at issue in Gustafson were actually defined in the statute, 
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not exceed the power which Congress has given the agency in the relevant 
statute,
110
 so why did the Court, when it donned its lexicographical robes, 
not start with the language of Section 10(b)?  Had it done so, it might have 
come to the awkward conclusion that JCM was a primary violator of that 
provision of the federal securities laws.  Perhaps that is a sufficient 
explanation as to why the Court shied away from the statute. 
Section 10(b), as noted earlier,
111
 provides in relevant part as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or any facility of any national securities exchange . . . .  
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any 
security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors.
112
 
 
whereas Rule 10b-5 does not actually define the word “make.”  Just as the term 
“prospectus” in the earlier case was susceptible of plain meaning, so too is the word 
“make.”  See infra Part III.A.2.  Justice Thomas had it right in Gustafson.  But just as he 
noted in the earlier opinion that “[t]he majority transforms § 10 into the tail that wags the 
1933 Act dog,” Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 589 (Thomas, J., dissenting), so too in Janus, now 
writing for the majority, Justice Thomas chose to let the sleeping dog of language lie. 
  A fifth prong to statutory analysis, one that was a favorite with former Justice John 
Paul Stevens, consists of a consideration of what the lower federal courts have done.  See, 
e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 192–201 (1994) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  In this hierarchy, the consideration of lower court opinions would 
probably rank on the same level as policy concerns and come after consideration of the 
overall legislative scheme.  The Court does not always consider what the lower courts have 
done, however, except perhaps to ignore their holdings, as happened in Central Bank itself.  
See infra note 176. 
 110. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212–14 (1976): 
Rule 10b-5 was adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission under § 
10(b).  The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with 
the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law . . . .  Thus, 
despite the broad view of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case, its 
scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 
10(b). 
 111. See supra note 35. 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2007).  An interesting argument made by the Janus petitioners 
in their initial brief was to the effect that the terms “directly or indirectly” were intended 
somehow to modify the jurisdictional reference to interstate commerce, which was provided 
in the statute to locate the federal securities laws within Congress’s enumerated powers 
under Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 
25, at 38 n.7.  As aptly pointed out by both the respondents and the United States as amicus 
curiae, however, “directly” and “indirectly” are adverbs that cannot grammatically modify 
prepositional phrases.  Instead, of course, these terms modify the verbs “use” and “employ,” 
and it is the view of this author that where one uses or employs a deceptive device or 
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What can be gleaned from the operative words of this provision?
113
  
Much. 
a. Indirectly 
The Court since the days of Central Bank has blithely ignored 
Polonius’s advice, “by indirections find directions out.”
114
  In Central Bank, 
the Court decided that there is no aiding-and-abetting liability in a private 
action brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, thereby expressing its 
concern that too broad a reading of the adverb “indirectly” would allow the 
plaintiff to recover from “persons who do not engage in the proscribed 
activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do.”
115
  It is 
perfectly reasonable, of course, for the Court, when “seeing no evil, hearing 
no evil” in the wording of a statute, to point out that a statute does not say 
what it does not say,
116
 but it should at least make some effort to 
 
contrivance, which JCM surely did, at least indirectly (if not directly), by allowing JIF to 
issue prospectuses which falsely promised that the Janus entities would prohibit market 
timing when, in fact, they were allowing certain hedge funds to engage in market timing, 
one has clearly violated Section 10(b).  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 27; Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 15 n.6, Janus Capital Grp. 
Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 4339892.   
 113. By “operative words,” this author means the following:  “indirectly,” the bête noire 
of the Court since the days of Central Bank, see Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 176 (1994):  “use,” “employ,” “device,” and “contrivance.”  
The terms “deceptive” and “manipulative” have by and large had fixed meanings since 
Santa Fe.  See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).  The word “deceptive,” 
which is the only one of these latter two which has any relevance to the Janus case, has been 
understood by the Court to refer to what one can call “a failure of disclosure” (i.e., either a 
material misrepresentation or a material omission), as those terms are understood in Rule 
10b-5(b), which was the provision that the Court actually construed in Janus.  See Santa Fe 
Indus., 430 U.S. at 469. 
 114. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 1, l. 64.  Rather than have a potential 
reader point out that the argument to be presented shortly is only a retread of this author’s 
position in James D. Redwood, Toward a More Enlightened Securities Jurisprudence in the 
Supreme Court? Don’t Bank on It Anytime Soon, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 3, 18–21 (1995), let me 
do so first.  This author believes that where the Court ignores language which appears in a 
statute which it says it is “construing,” it not merely engages in, at the best, “selective,” and 
at the worst, “sloppy,” analysis, but it also engages in raw judicial policy-making while 
purporting to show deference to the legislative will.  Apparently the Court doesn’t like the 
word “indirectly” any more than it liked the words “or any security not so registered” when 
it recently declared that Section 10(b) has no extraterritorial application.  See Morrison v. 
Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2873 (2010) (concerning action by foreign 
investors against an Australian banking corporation).  Yet, in both cases, the words are in 
the statute and are presumably there for a reason. 
 115. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176. 
 116. Keeping in mind, of course, that words are in the eyes of the beholder:  “When I use 
a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to 
mean—neither more nor less.”  LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 99 (1917) 
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acknowledge that the statute does say what, in fact, it does say.  And 
Section 10(b) does say that it is unlawful indirectly to use or employ a 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of SEC 
rules.  So what does that mean? 
According to the 1933 edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, the 
adverb “indirectly” means, among other things, “[b]y indirect action, 
means, connexion, agency, or instrumentality; through some intervening 
person or thing; mediately.”
117
  The petitioners in the Janus case made 
much of the fact that JCG, JCM, and JIF were all separate entities
118
 whose 
separate existence had to be respected by the courts.
119
  Although the 
respondents vigorously disputed petitioners’ characterization of the Janus 
entities as distinct and argued that the misleading JIF prospectuses were, in 
reality, issued by JCM in conjunction with JIF,
120
 the definition of 
“indirectly” given above respects the concept of separate corporate or 
entity status or existence.  Yet even if it is true that JIF directly issued the 
prospectus with the misleading information about market timing, JCM, an 
entity distinct from JIF, could still be held liable as a primary violator of 
Section 10(b) for having indirectly, through an intervening person (JIF), 
made the misrepresentations in question.  This is so regardless of whether 
JCM controlled JIF, as plaintiffs alleged,
121
 and regardless of the extent to 
which the funds and the investment adviser could be considered 
independent entities that adhered to the requisite formalities for separate 
organization and functioning. 
The Court’s only reference to the adverb “indirectly”
122
 was in 
 
(emphasis in original). 
 117. OED, supra note 1, at 1418 (emphasis added). 
 118. Business entities still qualify as “persons” for purposes of the federal securities 
laws.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(2) (2007) (defining “person” in the Securities Act as “an 
individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any 
unincorporated organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof . . . .”).  See 
also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (2007) (defining “person” in the Exchange Act as “a natural 
person, company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a 
government.”). 
 119. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 37; Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, Janus 
Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525), 2010 WL 
4774263. 
 120. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 37.  See also infra Part III.B for an 
argument to the effect that analogues to the veil-piercing theory of corporate law could lead 
to the not unreasonable conclusion that whatever separate status JCM and JIF (and JCG as 
well) may technically have enjoyed was overborne in this instance by the fraudulent nature 
of the conduct at issue, aside from any consideration of the close connection among all three 
entities and the high degree of control JCM apparently exercised over JIF’s business 
activities. 
 121. Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 26. 
 122. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2305 n.11 
(2011).  The Court’s sole reference to the adverb occurred within the framework of Rule 
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footnote 11, and it does little to advance the reader’s understanding of the 
term as used by either Congress or the SEC.  Indeed, the Court limited the 
word to a description of the method by which a statement is communicated, 
not that by which a statement is “made”:
123
  “We think that the phrase 
[‘directly or indirectly’] merely clarifies that as long as a statement is made, 
it does not matter whether the statement was communicated directly or 
indirectly to the recipient.”
124
  The Court then raised a familiar ghost, 
informing the reader that to hold otherwise would “erase the line between 
primary violators and aiders and abettors established by Central Bank.”
125
  
The Court also undercut one of the petitioner’s dubious linguistic 
arguments, namely that “indirectly” modifies the prepositional 
jurisdictional phrases rather than the verbs of actions that appear in both the 
statute and the rule.
126
  The majority correctly noted that the adverb 
“modifies not just ‘to make,’ but also ‘to employ’ and ‘to engage.’”
127
  
Finally, the Court stated that it was unnecessary for it to decide what was 
meant by communicating a made statement indirectly because “none of the 
statements in the prospectuses were [sic] attributed, explicitly or implicitly, 
to JCM,” and without attribution, there was no evidence that JIF was using 
a statement JCM originally “made.”
128
 
The Court’s analysis here does not withstand closer scrutiny.  First, 
although it is certainly true that “indirectly” modifies the verbs “to employ” 
and “to engage,” the adverb does not any less modify the verbs “to make [a 
material misstatement]” and “to omit [to state a material fact].”  It appears 
that the Court wished to minimize the significance of the adverb’s 
modification of “make” by coupling it with the two other verbs it 
mentioned, while, if the reader will allow, “omitting” for some reason to 
point out that “indirectly” also modifies “omit.”  But so what?  After all, 
“indirectly” appears in the lead-up language to the substantive provisions 
of Rule 10b-5, and no one disputes that the adverb was meant to cover the 
conduct prohibited in Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) as well as the speech 
proscribed in Rule 10b-5(b).  Yet the extent of coverage of a legal 
 
10b-5 since (as noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 106–10) the Court for some 
unexplained reason grounded its decision in the rule rather than in the statute.  This 
emphasis on the rule as opposed to the statute makes no difference for present purposes, 
however. 
 123. As the term “make” is used in the SEC rule.  See infra Part III.A.2 for a discussion 
of the multiple meanings of the word “make.”  As far as the unanalyzed statute is 
concerned, the Court’s view would apparently be that the adverb “indirectly,” as it appears 
therein, delimits the method by which a “device” or “contrivance” is communicated, rather 
than that by which a device or contrivance comes about or is “made.” 
 124. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n. 11. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 127. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n.11. 
 128. Id. 
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provision is no sure clue as to its meaning, and to say that a word applies to 
other sections of a rule does nothing to elucidate that meaning.  The Court 
seems to have ignored this distinction. 
Second, to make a statement, or to use or employ a device or 
contrivance, is not the same thing as conveying, communicating, 
disseminating, broadcasting, dispersing, publishing (what have you) the 
statement that was made or the device or contrivance that was used or 
employed.  The familiar refrain that emerging creative writers are often 
told is that it is just as important to write a novel and put it in your file 
cabinet as it is to have that novel published and end up on the New York 
Times Bestseller List.  Few writers who have undergone the arduous task of 
trying to produce the next great American novel would agree with that 
assessment, however.  Authors write, “or make,” if you will, a novel in 
order to have it communicated after it is made; an uncommunicated novel 
is just as “made” as a communicated one, but nowhere near as gratifying to 
the “maker.”
129
 
Furthermore, neither the actual language of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 nor the grammatical structure of the statute and rule supports the 
Court’s limitation of the word “indirectly” to the method of 
communication.  In fact, nowhere in either provision do the words 
“communicate” or “communication” appear.  Yet the words “make,” “use,” 
“employ,” “engage,” and “omit” do appear.  A Court wary of imparting 
hidden meaning to provisions of the securities law should not be so eager to 
import hidden language instead. 
Perhaps the Court felt that Congress’s inclusion of the word 
“communication” in other provisions of the securities laws justified its 
reading the word into Rule 10b-5.  For example, it is true that the 
jurisdictional nexus statement within Section 5 of the Securities Act
130
 
contains the words “means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce,”
131
 but that then exposes the Court 
to the well-worn argument that Congress chose its words carefully, that had 
it wished to add the word “communication” to Section 10(b) it knew how 
to do so and would have done so, and that therefore the absence of the 
word in either Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 was the product of a deliberate 
choice.  This point should not be made to carry more freight than is 
reasonable, however, because the jurisdictional language in Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 differs only slightly from that in Section 5 of the Securities 
Act.  The more important point, as noted earlier,
132
 is that the adverb 
“indirectly” may not, grammatically, modify the jurisdictional language, 
 
 129. See infra notes 201–04 and accompanying text. 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2007). 
 131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a)–(c) (emphasis added). 
 132. See supra note 112. 
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whether that language is the equivalent of “communicate[d]” or not, since 
that language appears in a string of prepositional phrases.  As alert students 
of English grammar know only too well, adverbs modify verbs, adjectives, 
or other adverbs, not prepositions.  In Section 10(b), therefore, “indirectly” 
modifies the verbs “to use” or “to employ”; in Rule 10b-5, it modifies the 
verbs “to employ,” “to engage,” “to omit,” and also, alas, to the Court’s 
evident chagrin, “to make.” 
Additionally, for the Court to state that any other construction of 
“indirectly” would eliminate the distinction between primary and aiding-
and-abetting liability adds nothing to Central Bank, which said virtually the 
same thing.
133
  Worse, this observation is the wolf of policy dressed up as 
the sheep of language, allowing the Court to stand statutory analysis on its 
head.  Policy should come last, not first, and should not be used to ignore 
the words actually chosen by both Congress and the SEC.  The Court’s not-
so-subtle agenda, in which policy now apparently trumps everything else if 
the statutory language stands as an inconvenient obstacle to the decision 
favored by a majority of the justices, is made manifest by the Court’s 
interment of the guiding philosophy behind Affiliated Ute,
134
 among other 
early cases, with its Pollyannaish pronouncement that Section 10(b) should 
be “construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its 
remedial purposes.’”
135
  That sentiment now seems a bit quaint, and today 
the Court’s clarion call is far different:  “‘[C]oncerns with the judicial 
creation of a private cause of action caution against its expansion . . . .’”
136
  
Therefore, “in analyzing whether JCM ‘made’ the statements for purposes 
of Rule 10b-5, we are mindful that we must give ‘narrow dimensions . . . to 
a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute 
and did not expand when it revisited the law.’”
137
  That is fine, except that 
in effectuating its policy preferences, the Court ignored the words actually 
used when Congress “enacted the statute.” 
Finally, when the Court announced that it did not need to explore what 
was meant by the infinitive phrase “to communicate a ‘made’ statement 
indirectly,” followed by the subordinate adverbial clause “because none of 
the statements in the prospectuses were [sic] attributed . . . to JCM,”
138
 the 
 
 133. See  Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 134. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).  The Court in 
that case held that a private plaintiff need not prove reliance in a Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 
omissions case, as long as the omissions in question are material.  Id. at 153–54. 
 135. Id. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 
(1963)). 
 136. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) 
(quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 148 
(2008)). 
 137. Id. (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167). 
 138. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305 n.11. 
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majority apparently confused the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 element of 
reliance with the element which requires that the defendant make a material 
misstatement or omission.
139
  As the parties’ briefs pointed out,
140
 one can 
“make” a misstatement that no one relies on, as the term “reliance” has 
come to be understood through several cases at the Supreme Court level.
141
  
Regardless of whether the fraud-on-the-market theory of Basic applies, it is 
standard securities law that the private plaintiff alleging fraud must prove 
reliance as part of his case-in-chief.  Although the Court in Janus did not 
definitively hold that reliance could only be proven where the 
misstatements in question are attributed, either explicitly or implicitly, to 
the defendant,
142
 it mistakenly appeared to believe that absent attribution, a 
statement is not even made.  But as noted earlier,
143
 one can make a 
statement that never sees the light of day, but which is nonetheless still 
indisputably made.  If the Court wishes to hold, after Stoneridge, that a 
misstatement which never comes to the attention of the plaintiff is not one 
on which the plaintiff can be said to have relied, and then to deny recovery 
on that basis, that is one thing.  But that does not mean that a misstatement 
was not actually made by the defendant, and the Court should not conflate 
what are in fact two separate elements of the Rule 10b-5 cause of action. 
b. To use or employ 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for any person 
“to use or employ” any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of SEC rules.
144
  The terms “use” and “employ” need not 
detain the reader long.  Among the OED definitions of “to use” are the 
following:  “to pursue or follow as a custom or usage”;
145
 “to enforce or put 
 
 139. See id. at 2301 n.3 (setting out the standard elements of a Rule 10b-5 action).  See 
also supra note 45. 
 140. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 9; Brief for Respondent, supra note 
25, at 9. 
 141. See generally Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 148;  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 
(1988) (decision regarding the presumption of reliance by class members in an action 
alleging a Securities  Exchange Act section 10(b) violation), and Affiliated Ute Citizens of 
Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
 142. Unlike some courts.  See, e.g., Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 
F.3d 144, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, No. 10-535, 2011 WL 2437055 (June 20, 
2011) (concerning an action against an attorney and a brokerage firm accused of fraudulent 
transactions where the court held that attribution was a necessary requirement for liability).  
Other courts find attribution unnecessary, at least in SEC actions, where reliance is not an 
element.  See, e.g., SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2008) (action by the SEC 
against a consultant alleged to have violated Federal securities law). 
 143. In what we can now perhaps call “The Great American Novel File Cabinet Rule.”  
See supra text accompanying note 124. 
 144. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2007). 
 145. OED, supra note 1, at 3574. 
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into practice”;
146
 “to prosecute or pursue (some course of action); to do, 
perform, carry on”;
147
 “to make use of (some immaterial thing) as a means 
or instrument; to employ for a certain end or purpose”;
148
 “to employ or 
make use of . . . , esp. for a profitable end or purpose”;
149
 and “to employ or 
give utterance to (words, phrases, etc.) to say, utter.”
150
  According to the 
same source, the verb “to employ” means, inter alia, “to apply a thing to 
some definite purpose; to use as a means or instrument, or as material”;
151
 
“to apply, devote (effort, thought, etc.) to an object”;
152
 and “to make use 
of.”
153
  Had the Supreme Court in Janus construed these two terms of the 
statute, rather than the word “make” in SEC Rule 10b-5, what might have 
been the outcome? 
Assuming that the misleading statements about market timing in the 
JIF prospectuses (or the prospectuses generally—the misstatements therein 
contained being considered “manipulative” or “deceptive”) could be 
deemed to be “devices” or “contrivances,”
154
 at the very least the 
previously quoted definition of “to use” could apply to JCM’s involvement 
in the Janus offerings.  If “to use” means “to say” or “to utter,” then it is 
virtually indistinguishable from the Court’s view that “to make a 
statement” is the equivalent of “to state.”
155
  Granted, this does not answer 
the question of who the sayer, the utterer, or the employer of a 
(mis)statement is, any more than we know who the “maker” of a 
(mis)statement is from the language of Rule 10b-5.  The point is simply 
that the Court could, and should, have focused on the statute rather than the 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  It is interesting to note that this definition plays the same word game with 
“give” that the Janus Court did with “make.”  See infra text accompanying notes 175–86.  
“To give utterance to” can be shortened to “to utter,” but does that tell us anything about the 
meaning of “give”?  Or does it tell us who “gives” a particular utterance? 
 151. OED, supra note 1, at 855. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  As examples of this last definition, the OED in parentheses lists “time” and 
“opportunities,” but without the “etc.” that occurs in the parenthetical of the definition of “to 
use” (see supra text accompanying note 150).  If the terms “time” and “opportunities” are 
meant to be exclusive rather than merely illustrative, then the term “to employ” in the sense 
of “to make use of” would not apply to the misstatements “made” in the Janus fund (JIF) 
prospectuses. 
 154. See infra notes 163–72 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the 
statutory terms ‘device’ and ‘contrivance’). 
 155. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).  
See infra notes 180–91 and accompanying text (extending the discussion of the Court’s 
rather peculiar fascination with the formulaic shortening of ‘to make a statement’ as being 
the equivalent of ‘to state’).  See also supra note 150 (discussing the comparably unclear 
understanding of the phrase ‘to give [utterance]’). 
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rule, and that, had it done so, it could have remained comfortably inside its 
policy-driven comfort zone, being predisposed as it was to deny liability in 
any event. 
Many of the other terms in the two OED definitions can also be 
substituted for “to make” without doing violence to the facts of the Janus 
case.  According to the allegations of the complaint, which must be 
accepted on appeal from a motion to dismiss,
156
 Janus (JCM) put into 
(deceptive) practice statements in the JIF prospectuses to the effect that it 
would restrict market timing.  Janus made use of those misstatements 
(assuming they may be considered “immaterial things”) as a means or 
instrument to achieve certain ends or purposes, such as:  currying favor 
with certain hedge funds, maintaining JCM’s inflated revenue, ensuring 
that the price of JCG stock remained artificially high (in the minds of the 
plaintiffs).
157
  Those same ends or purposes were certainly intended to inure 
to the profit or benefit of JCM, bringing JCM’s conduct within another of 
the related definitions of “to use,” namely “[t]o employ or make use of [the 
prospectuses or the misstatements] for a profitable end or purpose.”
158
  As 
for the word “employ,” again, it can be said that JCM used the 
misstatements in question as a means or instrument to attain some definite 
purpose or object.
159
  That purpose was the benefit gained by appeasing  the 
hedge fund clients who wished to engage in market timing and the 
deception of JIF’s long-term investors, who were unaware that Janus was 
permitting market timing to occur. 
Therefore, in essence, the verbs “to use” and “to employ” may be 
substituted for the verb “to make.”  This substitution would still allow the 
Court to reach its desired conclusion:  that JCM was no more the “user” or 
“employer” of a deceptive device or contrivance than it was the “maker” of 
an untrue statement of material fact in the JIF prospectuses.
160
 
So why did the Court rely on the rule rather than the statute?  Perhaps 
because it is one thing for the Court to withhold deference from an 
administrative rule which in its mind exceeds the agency’s statutory 
 
 156. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hatfill 
v. New York Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir. 2005)) (“‘We must accept as true all 
well-pleaded allegations and view the complaint in the light most favorable to’ the 
plaintiffs.”). 
 157. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 42 (explaining the preparation and filing 
of the challenged statements in the Janus case). 
 158. OED, supra note 1, at 3574. 
 159. This is something of a combination of the definition of ‘employ’ in the sense of “to 
apply (a thing) to some definite purpose” and ‘employ’ in the sense of “to apply, devote 
(effort . . .) to an object.”  Id.  The latter is listed in the OED as Definition 1.b and appears to 
be a subset of the former, which is listed as main Definition 1.  OED, supra note 1, at 855.  
The two may thus be combined for the sake of clarity. 
 160. However, it is the position of this author that JCM was the ‘maker,’ ‘user,’ or 
‘employer’ of the misstatements in the JIF prospectuses. 
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mandate, but it is a far more difficult matter for the Court to deny deference 
to a validly enacted statute.
161
  This is an especially awkward course for the 
justices to pursue where the statute, as construed, leads to the same 
conclusion as the rule the Court wishes to call into question.  After all, in 
an area of statutory interpretation such as the federal securities law, the 
Court can only invalidate a statute if it is unconstitutional; more often, its 
task is simply to construe the meaning of the statute and glean the intent of 
Congress.  Furthermore, its construction is always subject to Congressional 
override.  SEC rules are far more vulnerable to judicial attack, however, 
and if the agency wishes to protect itself from a court ruling with which it 
disagrees, it must go to Congress and seek to persuade that body to assert 
itself on the Commission’s behalf.
162
  The Janus Court followed the easier 
path by deciding that JCM fell outside the language of the rule, enabling it 
to avoid having to deal with the virtually identical language of the statute. 
c. Device or Contrivance163 
As already noted, manipulative or deceptive “devices” and 
“contrivances” are prohibited by Section 10(b).
164
  This language focuses 
on the “what,” rather than the “who” that was at issue in Janus, so again the 
analysis need not detain the reader long.  According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, among other things, a “device” is “[t]he action of devising, 
 
 161. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 44 n.9 (arguing that SEC views of 
private actions should receive no deference). 
 162. This is exactly what the SEC did after Central Bank, by getting Congress to amend 
Section 20 of the Exchange Act (adding new subsection (e)) to preserve the Commission’s 
aiding-and-abetting authority.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2007) (providing the new section).  
However, the decision in Central Bank was based on Section 10(b) rather than on Rule 10b-
5. 
 163. Construction of the terms ‘deceptive’ or ‘manipulative’ is beyond the scope of this 
article.  See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (analyzing the meanings of 
‘manipulative or deceptive’ within the context of Rule 10b-5).  Simply stated, ‘deceptive’ 
speech actionable under Section 10(b) is shorthand for a material misstatement or omission.  
Id. at 474 (deception requires proof of “a material misrepresentation or material failure to 
disclose.”).  It does not appear that defendant JCM contested the issue of whether the JIF 
prospectuses contained material misstatements concerning market timing.  What it did 
contest, of course, was who ‘made’ those misstatements:   
JCM, as a secondary actor, cannot be held primarily liable for unattributed 
statements made by another company in that company’s prospectuses.  The 
complaint was properly dismissed because it does not adequately allege either 
that JCM made the alleged misstatements or that the statements were directly 
attributed to it, which is a necessary predicate for presumed reliance. 
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 9 (emphasis in original).  The issue of reliance is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
 164. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2007). 
REDWOOD_FINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  2:57 PM 
490 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:2 
 
contriving, or planning . . . ; invention, ingenuity”;
165
 and “[s]omething 
devised or contrived for bringing about some end or result; an arrangement, 
plan, scheme, project, contrivance; an ingenious or clever expedient; often 
one of an underhand or evil character . . . .”
166
  A “contrivance” is defined 
similarly as “[t]he action of contriving or ingeniously endeavouring the 
accomplishment of anything; the bringing to pass by planning, scheming, 
or stratagem; . . . deceitful practice.”
167
  “Contrivance” is also defined as 
“[a] plan or scheme for attaining some end; an ingenious device or 
expedient; an artifice, a trick.”
168
 
Much of the language of “devices” and “contrivances” refers to the 
defendant’s state of mind (“underhand,” “evil character,” “deceitful 
practice”) and is therefore more properly understood as part of the Section 
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 element of scienter.
169
  The question here, however, is 
merely whether it is possible to consider the JIF prospectuses as either a 
“device” or a “contrivance.”  Regarding “device,” the prospectuses appear 
to have been the product of an “action of devising,” or “an invention,” of 
JCM, in conjunction with JCG and JIF (according to the plaintiffs), or of 
JIF alone (according to the defendants).  Additionally, those prospectuses 
may be considered as “something devised for bringing about [a particular] 
end or result,”
170
 namely the purchase of fund shares for long-term hold by 
investors ignorant of the fact (because it was not disclosed to them) that 
they were doing so to their disadvantage because of the presence of market 
timers in the funds as well. 
Each JIF prospectus can equally be considered a “contrivance.”  The 
term “contrivance” is tied to the accomplishment of, or the intent to 
accomplish, a desired end: “ingeniously endeavouring the accomplishment 
of anything”; “[a] plan or scheme for attaining some end.”
171
  In this case, 
the obvious purpose sought by a securities prospectus is the purchase of a 
security by the offeree who receives and presumably reads the 
prospectus.
172
  The “intent” behind a prospectus that violates Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 is to forestall non-sales of the securities in question by 
 
 165. OED, supra note 1, at 708. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 542. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (defining 
‘scienter’ as follows: “In this opinion the term ‘scienter’ refers to a mental state embracing 
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”). 
 170. OED, supra note 1, at 708. 
 171. Id. at 708 and 542. 
 172. A ‘prospectus’ is defined in broad general terms in section 2(a)(10) of the 1933 
Securities Act.  That section provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he term ‘prospectus’ means 
any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio 
or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security . . . .”  
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2007). 
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hiding the truth.  The allegedly undisclosed truths in the Janus case were 
that the presence of market timers would injure the long-term investors in 
the Janus funds, and that the representations to the effect that market timers 
would be banned by the funds could not be taken seriously.  The “plan” or 
“scheme,” i.e., the “device” or “contrivance,” for accomplishing that 
desired purpose was the various Janus prospectuses that were the subject of 
the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. 
2.  Rule 10b-5 Meets Its Maker 
As mentioned earlier, without explanation the Supreme Court in Janus 
grounded its refusal to hold JCM liable for the misstatements about market 
timing that appeared in the JIF prospectuses on the language of SEC Rule 
10b-5 rather than on Section 10(b).
173
  Although this is contrary to the 
Court’s established jurisprudence, which places preeminence on the 
statute,
174
 the Court’s doctrinal preference for the term “make” in Rule 10b-
5 must be accepted.  The Court’s conclusion that JCM was not the “maker” 
of the misstatements in the JIF prospectuses led it to craft a test, rather than 
adopt a definition or accept any of the common dictionary definitions of the 
words “make” or “maker.”
175
  As a result, it is the view of this author that 
the Court thereby engaged in the kind of inappropriately activist judicial 
lawmaking that it is wont to condemn.
176
  In fact, none of the myriad 
definitions of the verb “to make” supports the limitations that the Court 
 
 173. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 174. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)) (“In addressing this question 
[whether negligence is sufficient to show scienter, a question which the Court answered in 
the negative], we turn first to the language of § 10(b), for ‘the starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself.’”). 
 175. For purposes of the present article, analysis will be primarily, although not 
exclusively, confined to the meaning of the word ‘make,’ rather than the meaning of the 
word ‘maker.’  This is not to suggest that the meaning of the noun differs in any material 
respect from the meaning of the verb. 
 176. Perhaps excessive meddling on the part of judges in matters beyond the judicial ken 
was one of the things that was on the Court’s mind in Central Bank, given that every single 
court of appeals that had considered the issue had come to the conclusion that a private party 
could sue for aiding-and-abetting violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  See  Cent. 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the majority’s treatment of aider-and-abettor liability under Section 
10(b)).  This problem, if it is one, was certainly on the Court’s mind when it recently 
rejected the Second Circuit’s ‘conduct’ and ‘effects’ test for extraterritorial application of 
Section 10(b) and held that, given the silence of the statute on the issue of whether it applied 
to foreign transactions, “[t]he results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining what 
Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court—
demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality.”  Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010). 
REDWOOD_FINALIZED_THREE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/21/2012  2:57 PM 
492 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:2 
 
placed on the term, suggesting that the Court deliberately chose to 
superimpose its raw policy preferences onto the actual language of Rule 
10b-5. 
Rule 10b-5 provides in relevant part as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,   by the 
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.
177
 
As noted earlier,
178
 the traditional elements of a Rule 10b-5 action are 
the following: “‘(1) a material misrepresentation or omission [made] by the 
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or 
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the 
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss 
causation.’”
179
 
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Janus with the 
uncontroversial observation that “[o]ne ‘makes’ a statement by stating 
it.”
180
  The Court then demonstrated its fascination with a supposed 
definition to the effect that “[w]hen ‘make’ is paired with a noun 
expressing the action of a verb, the resulting phrase is ‘approximately 
equivalent in sense’ to that verb.”
181
  The Court was equally enamored with 
the conclusion of Noah Webster or his lexicographical progeny that 
“‘[m]ake followed by a noun with the indefinite article is often nearly 
equivalent to the verb intransitive corresponding to that noun.’”
182
  All this 
 
 177. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (2010). 
 178. See Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 n.3 
(2011) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 
(2008)) (stating the standard elements of a Rule 10b-5 action). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 2302. 
 181. Id. (quoting OED, supra note 1, at 1701 (1st ed. 1933)).  The Court noted in 
parenthesis that the OED language was taken from “(def. 59) . . . .”  Id.  The ensuing 
discussion in this article also refers to this definition as “definition 59,” following the 
Court’s example. 
 182. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1485 (2d ed. 1934) 
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may be true, but so what? 
It should first be observed that these are not really definitions of the 
verb “to make” but rather examples of its usage.  It is a way of saying that 
one can use shorthand if “make” is used in a certain way, but not when it is 
used in other ways.  The Court illustrates this point by saying that there is a 
difference between “making a statement,” which can be shortened to “to 
state,” and “making a chair,” which obviously cannot be sensibly shortened 
to “to chair.”
183
  The sources cited by the Court do indeed support this 
proposition, and it is not here pretended otherwise.  For example, the OED 
lists some 118 examples of shorthand usages of “make” followed by certain 
nouns, some of which, concededly, refer to speech (e.g., to make a 
proclamation, a reply, a proposal, etc.), although many others do not (e.g., 
to make an advance, an appearance, a stand, etc.).
184
  But how does the fact 
that the verb can be “shorthanded” in certain situations, but not in others, 
actually tell us who “makes” something, whether that something be a 
statement, a chair, or anything else?  If “definition 59”
185
  were truly a 
definition, presumably it would tell us.  All it does, however, before 
providing us with the list of examples mentioned above, followed by the 
etymological evolution of the term which is standard to the OED, is to say 
the following: 
With sbs. [subjects] expressing the action of vbs. [verbs] 
(whether etymologically cognate or not), make forms in-
numerable phrases approximately equivalent in sense to those 
verbs.
186
  In some of these phrases the obj. [object]-noun appears 
always without qualifying word;
187
 in others it may be preceded 
by the indefinite article, or by a possessive adj. [adjective] 
relating to the subject of the sentence.
188
  When standing alone, 
 
(emphasis in original)).  It is peculiar that the Court decided to use dictionaries which were 
dated in 1933 and 1934, at the time the two main securities statutes on which it did not rely, 
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, were enacted, rather 
than on dictionaries published around 1942, when Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the SEC.  
This author uses the 1884 version of the OED, which was the one on which the 1933 edition 
was based.  See OED, supra note 1 (defining the term “to make or to mar.”). 
 183. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  Of course, one can make someone the chair (person) of 
something, but in that case the shorthand expression “to chair” refers not to the act of having 
been appointed to that position, but rather to the exercise of the powers of that position after 
the appointment.  This, obviously, was not what the Court was trying to articulate. 
 184. OED, supra note 1, at 1701.  If one wished to be picky, one might note that this list 
does not contain the words “make a statement,” but in fairness it should be pointed out that 
the list does not purport to be exhaustive.  Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Note that this does not actually tell us what the “sense” (or meaning) of any of those 
verbs actually is. 
 187. For example, one normally says “to make mention” rather than “to make a 
mention,” both of which could be “shorthanded” to “to mention.” 
 188. For example, “to make a change,” (i.e., “to change”) is an example of make 
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the combination of make with its object is equivalent to a verb 
used intr. [intransitively] or absol. [absolutely];
189
 but in many 
instances the obj.-noun admits or requires construction with of, 
and this addition converts the phrase into the equivalent of a 
transitive verb.
190
 
All of this may help explain why James Henry Murray was such a 
colorful, not to say eccentric, person,
191
 but to state the effect of certain 
usages of a word does not in and of itself give a clue as to its meaning.  
What we now know is that certain shorthand usages of “make” apparently 
sometimes render the verb transitive in nature and at other times render it 
intransitive.  And it must be borne in mind that the Court (and the above 
discussion) focuses only on “definition 59” of the verb “make.”
192
  The 
OED contains, including definitions of “make” followed by prepositions 
and adverbs, some ninety-six definitions in total.
193
 
What the foregoing is meant to suggest is that the Court’s dabbling in 
 
followed by the indefinite article.  This is of course much different than “to make change” in 
the sense of exchanging coins for dollar bills, which cannot be “shorthanded” in any 
meaningful sense.  See also infra note 189.  “He made his discovery of (i.e., “he 
discovered”) her insincerity too late to be of any use” is an example of the object noun 
(“discovery”) preceded by the possessive adjective “his” which relates to the subject of the 
sentence (“He”). 
 189. Again, if one says “to make change,” that apparently is the equivalent of “make” 
used intransitively, as would be the case with the phrase “to make reference (to),” (i.e., “to 
refer (to)”).  It should be noted, however, that the expression “to make change” is not an 
example of “make” forming a phrase which is approximately equivalent in sense to the verb 
“to change,” whereas “to make a change” is, as is true also of “to make reference (to),” 
which corresponds nicely with “to refer (to).”  “Absolute construction” has been explained 
as follows::  
Defined by the OED as ‘standing out of the usual grammatical relation or 
syntactical construction with other words,’ it consists in English of a noun or 
pronoun that is not the subject or object of any verb or the object of any 
preposition but is attached to a participle or an infinitive . . . .  
HENRY W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 4 (2d ed. 1965).  Fowler 
does not give a citation for his OED quotation, but he does give a couple of examples of 
“absolute construction”:  “The play being over, we went home” and “Let us toss for it, loser 
to pay.”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 190. OED, supra note 1, at 1701 (emphases in original).  This is not altogether clear.  
Presumably what is meant here is that, for example, the phrase “to make offer” or “to make 
an offer” requires addition of the preposition “of” after “offer.”  Both are the equivalent of 
the infinitive “to offer” (not requiring the preposition but followed by a direct object), but 
because the phrases formed with “make” both require the addition of the preposition, 
“make” is to be considered the equivalent of a transitive verb. 
 191. Murray was the editor of the OED at the time of the 1884 edition, on which the 
1933 version which the Janus Court cited was based.  See OED, supra note 1; see also 
JAMES MURRAY (LEXICOGRAPHER), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Murray 
(lexicographer) (last visited August 18, 2011). 
 192. See supra note 181. 
 193. OED, supra note 1, at 1700–03. 
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syntax and word construction did very little to elucidate meaning.  This is 
regrettable because the meaning of the word “make,” as used in Rule 10b-
5(b) was, after all, the primary issue in the Janus case.  Perhaps 
recognizing that its excursion into “definition 59,” dead-ending as it did in 
the cul-de-sac of the transitive versus intransitive debate, did almost 
nothing to advance understanding of the term, and being perhaps too 
daunted to tackle any of the other ninety-five definitions propounded by the 
OED, the Court abruptly abandoned the definitional field entirely and 
substituted instead a “test” for what is meant by the verb “to make.”
194
  The 
Court, without citing to any authority, held the following: 
For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is the 
person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, 
including its content and whether and how to communicate it.  
Without control, a person or entity can merely suggest what to 
say, not ‘make’ a statement in its own right.
195
 
The Court justified this test, which it fashioned out of whole cloth, by 
reiterating its belief that lack of attribution prevents one from being a 
maker, which, as noted earlier,
196
 goes to the separate element of reliance, 
not the element of whether the defendant made an untrue statement.  The 
majority opinion also repeated the familiar refrain that for the Court to 
decide otherwise would be tantamount to overruling Central Bank and 
would obliterate the distinction between primary and aiding-and-abetting 
liability.
197
  Finally, the Court played its policy hand:  “[o]ur holding . . . 
accords with the narrow scope that we must give the implied private right 
of action . . . . Although the existence of the private right is now settled, we 
will not expand liability beyond the person or entity that ultimately has 
authority over a false statement.”
198
  The result of the Court’s decision is 
clear:  the already-enfeebled private Rule 10b-5 right is now on life support 
and cannot be expected to survive. 
In justifying its novel “control” or “ultimate authority” test, the Court 
cited to an example suggested by the petitioners:
199
  although a 
speechwriter drafts a speech for someone, it is the person who delivers the 
speech who has ultimate control over it and who is therefore the speech’s 
sole “maker.”
200
  Initially, it should be noted that nothing in logic or 
 
 194. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 138–43. 
 197. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  The Court also felt that the definition of “make” 
propounded by the respondents and the government was at odds with Stoneridge.  Id. at 
2303. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 11. 
 200. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  The petitioners used the example of a speechwriter for 
the President; see also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 11. 
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linguistics compels the conclusion that a statement, or indeed anything else, 
has to have one and only one “maker.”  The Court’s “either-or” approach is 
thus ill-founded.  Can it be said, for example, that a building has but one 
“maker”?
201
  Although a sign on a construction site might identify the 
architect or the general contractor,
202
 does that any the less make 
unidentified subcontractors not also the “makers” of the building?  
Certainly a person injured by faulty plumbing or electrical wiring in a 
building would expect that the subcontractor who designed, manufactured, 
constructed, or installed the defective plumbing or wiring would be held at 
least partly responsible for her injury, on the common understanding that 
that subcontractor was one of the “makers” of the building (assuming, of 
course, that the cause of the injury could be traced to the work of that 
subcontractor).  And this would be so regardless of whether the architect or 
the general contractor might also be liable.  Would a plaintiff be forced to 
choose a single defendant, on the theory that only that defendant and no 
one else “made” the defect?  What if it is ultimately established that the 
feature that caused plaintiff’s injury was defective in design, construction, 
manufacture, and installation?  Who is the “maker” then?
203
  Is it sensible 
in this context to limit liability solely to that one person with “ultimately 
authority” and “control,” presumably the general contractor?  Just to ask 
the question is to indicate a serious shortcoming in the Janus Court’s 
analysis and to point out that the majority’s conclusion that there can be 
one and only one “maker” of a statement is overly simplistic. 
Another example more akin to the Court’s analysis than the world of 
construction law should suffice to make this point clear.  Who is the 
“maker” of a newspaper article?  Who is the “maker” of a short story 
striving to make its way in the highly competitive world of literary 
magazine publication?  Or a poem?  The reporter or creative writer who 
crafts the piece lacks “ultimate authority over the statement, including its 
content
204
 and whether and how to communicate it.”
205
  That discretion lies 
 
 201. Or one “builder”?  Note that although it was apparently significant to the Court that 
“to make a statement” is “to state,” and that one cannot “shorthand” to make a chair” to “to 
chair,” one can shorten “to make a building” to “to build.”  Is that significant, however?  
Does it tell us who actually is the maker or builder? 
 202. Again, although attribution, either express or implied, may help prove or disprove 
the reliance element per Stoneridge, PIMCO, and similar cases, it says nothing definitive 
about who is the “maker,” which is necessary in order to satisfy the critical first element of 
Rule 10b-5, namely that a misstatement or omission be “made” by the defendant.  See supra 
note 45 (detailing the standard elements of a Rule 10b-5 action). 
 203. It should be noted that the capacious field of products liability law is well beyond 
the scope of this article.  The whole point of the foregoing discussion is merely to 
emphasize the difficulty in limiting the term “maker” to one, and only one, person or entity, 
as the Janus Court appeared to do. 
 204. With respect to “content,” at least, this statement may not be entirely accurate.  In 
today’s busy world of commercial and literary publication, many editors, and even agents, 
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with the editor.  However, the fact that the strategic decisions as to whether 
to accept the work, what to cut and what to add (the editing process), or 
where in the newspaper or literary magazine the article, short story, or 
poem will appear (layout) are all made by someone other than the reporter 
or writer who actually authored the piece does not make that reporter or 
writer any less its true “maker.”  The general assumption about such short 
written pieces is that the author is indeed the “maker,” the sole maker, if 
the Court wants it that way.  And this is so even though the fate of that 
author (in terms of whether his or her handiwork ever sees the light of day) 
lies entirely in the hands of an editor.  For longer works the “maker” is 
even clearer:  a historian is the “maker” of a history book; a novelist is the 
“maker” of a novel, not the agent or the publisher.  The plaintiffs in Janus 
alleged that JCM, the investment adviser, wrote or drafted the 
misrepresentations about market timing that appeared in the JIF 
prospectuses.  To hold that JCM was the, or at least a, maker of these 
misstatements comports with the common understanding of authorship 
discussed above.
206
 
Furthermore, the Court’s “ultimate authority” or “control” test is 
unmoored to any of the myriad definitions of “make” found in the OED, 
none of which contains such a requirement.  Without attempting an 
exhaustive enumeration, the verb “to make” is defined in the OED in 
various ways as follows:  “To bring into existence by construction or 
elaboration”;
207
 “[to] compose, write as the author (a book, poem, or other 
literary
208
 work . . . )”;
209
 “[t]o draw up (a legal document)”;
210
 “[t]o cause 
 
barely edit an author’s work, if they do so at all.  They do not have the time.  The work is 
often simply accepted or rejected as is.  So who, then, in that situation, has “ultimate 
authority” over content?  Not the editor or the agent.  And as to who decides “whether and 
how to communicate [a written piece],” what about self-publication?  Or online publication? 
 205. Janus, 131 S. Ct.  at 2302. 
 206. The petitioners in Janus tried to draw a distinction between a newspaper article that 
appears under the byline of a particular reporter and a newspaper editorial (or perhaps a 
court’s unsigned per curiam opinion).  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 41–42.  As 
discussed earlier, however, this distinction goes to attribution and the Rule 10b-5 element of 
reliance and says nothing about who, in fact, “makes” the statements in an editorial or in a 
per curiam opinion.  See supra text accompanying notes 138–43. 
 207. OED, supra note 1, at 1700. 
 208. Is a prospectus a “literary” work?  Debate on this issue is well beyond the scope of 
this article, and the topic is probably better left alone. 
 209. OED, supra note 1, at 1700. 
 210. Id.  Is a prospectus a “legal” document?  Given how few people apparently read it, 
indubitably.  See, e.g., MUTUAL FUND NAV, THE MUTUAL FUND PROSPECTUS—ANYBODY 
READING THEM?, http://www.mutualfundnavx.com/the-mutual-fund-prospectus-anybody-
reading-them/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2011) (“Some regulators have come to the conclusion 
that the average ‘mom and pop’ investor has a difficult time even picking up and perusing—
much less understanding—the statutorily required hundred-plus-page prospectuses that 
mutual funds distribute.”). 
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to be or become (something specified)”;
211
 “[t]o do, perform, 
accomplish”;
212
 and finally, “[t]o offer, present, render.”
213
 
None of these definitions precludes the possibility of multiple makers, 
nor does any of them require a single maker.  In addition, not one of them 
limits the term “make” to a person or entity with ultimate authority, 
control, or final say over the content of the made statement, whether it is 
communicated, or how it is communicated.  Yet all of these potential 
definitions could easily encompass JCM as a “maker” of the misstatements 
in the JIF prospectuses.
214
 
It is apparent, then, if one accepts the allegations of the complaint, that 
JCM, at least indirectly, “brought into existence by construction” the JIF 
prospectus misrepresentations to the effect that the funds would not 
condone market timing.
215
  Therefore, JCM can be considered the “author” 
of the misstatements in question.
216
  And, although the Court in the Janus 
case expressed reservations about the theory of the government and 
respondent that one can be deemed the “maker” of a statement simply by 
causing that statement to exist,
217
 it is worth noting that the OED expressly 
 
 211. OED, supra note 1, at 1701. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1702. 
 214. One bone of contention during oral argument in the Janus case that was not entirely 
cleared up was who, exactly, actually drafted the prospectuses.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 12–13, Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (No. 09-525): 
JUSTICE GINSBURG:  Mr. Perry [Counsel for Petitioners-Appellants, Janus 
Capital Group, Inc., et al.], you—you said that it was the fund’s lawyers who 
drafted the prospectus, but, in fact, it was JCM’s lawyers, the lawyers—they 
were in-house lawyers for JCM.  And they served—and they served the funds in 
doing this prospectus, but they were on the payroll of JCM, and they were 
JCM’s legal department. 
MR. PERRY:  Your Honor, like all lawyers, they wear multiple hats.  I 
represent multiple clients.  These lawyers represent multiple clients. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG:  I thought they were in-house lawyers? 
MR. PERRY:  They are in-house lawyers at JCM, but they also represent the 
funds, and the SEC has specifically recognized in the context of investment 
companies that where an adviser counsel is representing the funds, his client or 
her client, for those purposes, is the funds.  And here, these lawyers are very 
careful to separate who their—their clients are for various purposes. 
 215. If ‘construction’ is accepted as the equivalent of ‘composition.’ 
 216. See supra text accompanying note 206 (discussing the issue of authorship even in 
the absence of ultimate control.) 
 217. Janus, 131 U.S. at 2303–04 (noting that the Court dismissed this assertion, first, by 
falling back on the unconvincing and baffling distinction between “to make a chair” and “to 
make a statement” (see supra text accompanying notes 180–93), and second, by essentially 
retreating, incorrectly, into the reliance rationale illustrated by Stoneridge).  But see supra 
text accompanying notes 138–43 (explaining that reliance is a separate issue from that of 
whether defendants actually “made” a misstatement.) 
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recognizes that very possibility:  to “make” is “[t]o cause to be or 
become.”
218
  JCM can also be said to have “accomplished” the 
misstatements by drafting the prospectuses and may further have been said 
to have “offered, presented, or rendered” them as well.
219
  This last 
definition may fall within the classification of dissemination and 
distribution, which, according to the petitioners, was an insufficient basis 
on which to find that someone is a “maker,”
220
 but it should be emphasized 
that the OED definitions are comprehensive and include both the creative 
and distributive processes as being part of what it means “to make.”
221
 
One can readily see that the dictionary does not limit the words 
“make” or “maker” to a single person or entity, and certainly not to those 
who have the power of “ultimate authority” or “control.”
222
  Since the 
Court’s task was to determine the meaning of the word “make” in the SEC 
prohibition to the effect that it is unlawful “[t]o make an[] untrue statement 
of material fact . . .,” it is curious that the majority gave such cavalier 
treatment to what the dictionaries actually say.
223
  Perhaps the Court was 
simply reluctant to rely on lay dictionaries to define what it deemed to be 
essentially a legal term, although the Court in its opinion never expressed 
any reservations to that effect.  In any event, the analysis given in this 
article would not change if one consulted Black’s Law Dictionary.  
“Make,” according to that authoritative source, is, among other things, “[t]o 
cause to exist . . . [t]o form, to fashion, or produce.  To do, perform, or 
execute . . . to prepare and sign
224
 . . . to sign, execute, and deliver . . . [t]o 
 
 218. OED, supra note 1, at 1701. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 42–43 (describing dissemination as 
understood in Janus). 
 221. The Court objected to the government’s definition of ‘make’ as being the functional 
equivalent of ‘create,’ Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303.  But once again, if one uses an actual 
definition rather than applying an artificial test designed necessarily to screen out all but one 
person or entity—namely that person or entity with ‘ultimate authority’ or ‘control’—the 
verb ‘to create’ can be seen to be fully compatible with the verb ‘to make.’  See, e.g., OED, 
supra note 1, at 1700 (noting that to “make” is “[t]o compose, write as the author . . . .”). 
 222. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 223. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2010).  This subsection of the rule also prohibits material 
omissions, but the plaintiffs in Janus did not pursue JCM on an omissions theory, largely 
because they were the purchasers of JCG stock, not stock in JIF, and JCM owed them no 
duty with respect to any omissions in the JIF prospectuses for which JCM might have been 
responsible.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 46.  A successful omissions case must 
be premised on breach of a disclosure duty.  See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
239 n.17 (1988) (noting that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under 
Rule 10b-5”); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (adopting a similar rule). 
 224. This part of the definition might have made JCM squirm, but fortunately the Court 
never dredged it up to embarrass the petitioners.  According to the respondents, JCM 
prepared the JIF prospectuses, and ‘Janus,’ using the name collectively, apparently signed 
them.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 20, 32–33.  It was also the view of the 
plaintiffs that in the minds of the public the Janus entities were virtually indistinguishable.  
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conclude . . . , as to make a contract . . . .”
225
  As can be seen, these terms 
largely mirror the lay definitions of “make” utilized by both parties and the 
Court.  Using them, one can easily conclude that JCM was a “maker” of the 
JIF misstatements. 
The Court thus appears to view the word “make” as a policy 
gatekeeper, rather than as a term that has definitional significance.  There 
can only be one “maker” in the Court’s monotheistic securities world, and 
although it must be acknowledged that we are thereby enabled to avoid 
some of the messy entanglements and petty jealousies that afflict 
polytheistic mythologies, we thereby do violence to the written law.
226
  As 
perhaps the most scrupulous and astute exponent of the securities laws ever 
to sit on the high Court has reminded us, one should always start with the 
language of the statute,
227
 and should give it full effect before moving on to 
other considerations.
228
  Had the Court in Janus done so, paying 
conscientious attention to what the word “make” actually means, it would 
have been forced to recognize that JCM was indeed a “maker,” even if only 
 
See id. at 4, 53.  The fungibility of the various Janus entities goes well beyond the problem 
of attribution and addresses squarely the issue confronted (and, in the view of this author, 
incorrectly decided) by the Court, namely who ‘made’ the misstatements in the various JIF 
prospectuses. 
 225. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 861 (5th ed. 1979).  The Court might have derived some 
comfort from the fact that the Eldorado word “authority” does, in fact, appear among the 
legal definitions of “make,” but it would have then quickly had to realize that it had merely 
struck a vein of Fool’s Gold: “[t]o have authority [note the absence of the crucial adjective 
“ultimate”] or influence; to support or sustain; as in the phrase, ‘This precedent makes for 
the plaintiff.’”  Id.  Of course, most of the Supreme Court’s precedents in the securities law 
area “make” rather loudly for the defendant, not for the plaintiff.  Janus is simply the latest 
addition to the choir. 
 226. One need merely consult THE ILIAD or THE ORESTEIA to see the disadvantages of 
belief in multiple makers.  See HOMER, THE ILIAD (Richmond Lattimore, trans. 1951); 
AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA (David Grene & Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, trans. 1989).  Both 
works aptly presage Gloucester’s dismal observation that “[a]s flies to wanton boys are we 
to the th’ gods / They kill us for their sport.”  William Shakespeare, KING LEAR, act 4, sc. 1, 
ll. 36–37.  Yet, even if this is the case with respect to literature and religion, the law need 
not labor under similar disadvantages. 
 227. Alternatively, one should start with the rule, as in this case, since the Court chose to 
base its decision on Rule 10b-5 rather than on Section 10(b). 
 228. The reference is to Justice Lewis Powell, a successful corporate lawyer with Hunton 
& Williams in Richmond, Virginia, and one-time president of the American Bar 
Association.  Although considered conservative, Justice Powell would not have elevated 
other concerns, including policy considerations, over the language of the statute.  For a good 
example of Justice Powell’s close attention to statutory language, see John Nuveen & Co. v. 
Sanders, 450 U.S. 1005, 1008–11 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress used 
its words with precision, and the term “reasonable care” in Securities Act § 12(a)(2), 15 
U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2007), does not mean the same thing as the term “reasonable 
investigation” in Securities Act § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2007)).  Perhaps the same 
respect for statutory language does not move the Court as much today as it did in the days of 
Justice Powell. 
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a co-maker, of the misrepresentations in the JIF prospectuses, rendering it 
subject to liability as a primary violator of Rule 10b-5 (as long as all the 
other elements of Rule 10b-5 liability were satisfied).  The Court, however, 
was apparently unwilling to do this, preferring instead to let the tail of 
policy wag the dog of language.  In the process the Court has continued 
down the path of restricting the implied private right of action under the 
securities laws to a mere shell of its former self.
229
 
B.  A Side Note on Veil-Piercing 
Although the respondents in the Janus case did not explicitly seek to 
pursue liability against JCM on a piercing-the-corporate-veil theory,
230
 the 
Supreme Court refused to extend liability beyond JIF, the (sole) party that 
the Court deemed to possess ultimate authority and control over the 
misstatements in the funds’ prospectuses, partly out of a belief that to do so 
would unwarrantably require it to “disregard the corporate form.”
231
  The 
Court placed great emphasis on the fact that although JCM, as the 
investment adviser to JIF, exercised “significant influence” over the 
funds,
232
 all “corporate formalities were observed” and JCM and JIF 
remained “legally separate entities . . . .”
233
  This may be so, yet the 
respondents convincingly demonstrated that there was substantial overlap 
among the three Janus entities, JCG, JCM and JIF, and significant 
confusion in the minds of the public as to who the actual issuer of the 
 
 229. The high-water mark of securities litigation in the Supreme Court can be deemed to 
extend from the Court’s earliest cases, such as SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 
(1946) (adopting the “investment contract” test for what is a security), and SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (construing the “private offering” exemption of § 4(2) of 
the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2007)), until about the early 1970’s, in cases such as 
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (holding that Congress 
in § 10(b) intended to bar securities fraud in face-to-face transactions as well as in the 
organized marketplace).  Beginning shortly after that time—with a few exceptions, such as, 
for example, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (showing that 
allegations of fraud in a registration statement are cognizable under § 10(b), as well as under 
Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k); Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Inc., 
532 U.S. 588 (2001) (noting that the sale of an option to buy a security with no intention to 
honor that option is actionable § 10(b) fraud); and SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) 
(holding that a broker who sells customer securities and then misappropriates the proceeds 
commits fraud “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a security under § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5)—the Court has mostly read the 1933 and 1934 Acts, particularly Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5, quite restrictively.  The Janus case is merely the latest in a long line of 
cases representing this trend toward retrenchment.  See cases cited, supra note 3 (illustrating 
this trend toward retrenchment). 
 230. Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 41 n.19. 
 231. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
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prospectuses really was (an entity vaguely identified simply as “Janus”).
234
  
Therefore, even if it is true that there was respect for the separate entity 
status of the collective petitioners and that they honored all corporate 
formalities, these are beside the point, as will next be shown.  It is 
unfortunate that the Court did not recognize this. 
It is elementary hornbook law that courts will “pierce the corporate 
veil” of limited liability and impose liability on another entity or on the 
individual(s) behind the corporation in order “‘to prevent fraud or to 
achieve equity.’”
235
  It has also been noted that “[t]here are three primary 
variants within the ‘piercing the corporate veil’ jurisprudence—(1) the 
‘instrumentality’ doctrine, (2) the ‘alter ego’ doctrine, and (3) the ‘identity’ 
doctrine.”
236
  The first of these doctrines, the “instrumentality rule,” focuses 
on three factors:  (a) control amounting to complete domination by one 
business entity or individual over another business entity; (b) the use of 
such control to perpetrate fraud or other wrongdoing; and (c) a showing by 
the plaintiff that the defendant’s abuse of the corporate form proximately 
caused the plaintiff injury.
237
  The “alter ego” test is generally shortened to 
two factors: (a) such unity of interest and ownership between the corporate 
entity and its controlling shareholder(s) that the independent entity status of 
the corporation has ceased to exist, and (b) a concern that failure by the 
court to pierce the veil would sanction a fraud or lead to inequity.
238
  The 
“identity” theory, a less frequently used approach, is virtually 
indistinguishable in content and articulation to the “alter ego” doctrine.
239
 
It should first be noted that in the Janus situation the veil-piercing 
doctrine would not have applied per se, given the fact that the entities 
sought to be pierced, the various Janus funds, were publicly owned by their 
shareholders and not private or closely held corporations.
240
  This is 
presumably one reason why the plaintiffs did not pursue the theory in their 
attempts to go behind the shield provided by the Janus funds in order to 
reach JCM.  Given this fact, however, it is curious that the Court placed 
 
 234. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 53; Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 112, at 29 (discussing the issuer of the 
prospectus). 
 235. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 417 (1966) (quoting Int’l Aircraft Trading 
Co. v. Mfr’s Trust Co., 297 N.Y. 285, 292 (1948)). 
 236. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW 127 (3d ed. 
2011). 
 237. Id.  
 238. Id. at 127–28. 
 239. Id. at 128.  Indeed, as the hornbook authors note, all three approaches to veil-
piercing are essentially interchangeable.  Id. 
 240. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 25, at 3; Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 3.  
See also Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1039 (1991) (stating that “piercing occurs only in close corporations 
or within corporate groups; it does not occur in public corporations”). 
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such heavy emphasis on the separate corporate existence of the various 
Janus entities and their adherence to corporate formalities, which are 
significant by and large primarily in the veil-piercing context.
241
  These 
factors are important when courts weigh whether two purportedly separate 
corporations are in fact a “single economic entity,”
242
 under some version 
or another of the instrumentality, alter ego, or identity test.
243
  More 
specifically, these factors are relevant only to show the degree of control 
which one entity has over another (in this case, JCM over JIF), or which an 
individual (or more than one individual) exercises over an entity.  They are 
totally beside the point given the gravamen of the Janus plaintiffs’ 
complaint, which was based on fraud.  Fraud constitutes grounds for 
piercing the corporate veil separate and apart from the control, domination, 
or “uniquely close relationship” theory which seemed to obsess the 
Court.
244
  Where fraud exists, the party whose veil plaintiff seeks to pierce 
need not be controlled or dominated by the person or entity behind the 
corporate shield, and the Court should have recognized this distinction and 
given it credence. 
It has been cogently noted that “[m]isrepresentation is a familiar and 
widely used concept in the law . . . .  Moreover, it is the dominant approach 
in fact used by the courts in deciding whether to pierce the corporate 
veil.”
245
  Although some  sources limit application of a misrepresentation or 
fraud approach to justify veil-piercing to situations where “separate 
incorporation is misleading to creditors,” driving up the information costs 
 
 241. The Court’s somewhat egregious mention of the separate corporate existence and 
adherence to formalities factors came as a reply to the respondent’s argument that there was 
a “‘well-recognized and uniquely close relationship between a mutual fund and its 
investment adviser.’” Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 
2304 (2011) (quoting Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 21).  This assertion by the 
respondent the Court did not deny.  And although the Court emphasized that the board of 
trustees of the funds contained only one member with a connection to JCM, making the 
board more independent than was required by the two main statutes governing these entities, 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (see id. at 
2299, 2304), the Court was forced to acknowledge that all of the officers of JIF were also 
officers of JCM.  Id. at 2299.  Since, according to the respondents, the Janus funds had no 
employees of their own (see Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 40), the veil-piercing 
factors of control and domination would almost certainly have been met had the doctrine 
applied. 
 242. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (2d Cir. 1995) (analyzing the factors 
to determine separate corporate existences). 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 236–39. 
 244. See supra note 241 and Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 (quoting Brief for Respondent, 
supra note 25, at 21). 
 245. Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 499, 521 (1976).  See also Thompson, supra note 240, at 1059:  “a large segment of 
the contract cases . . . arise [sic] in situations where the court is concerned with possible 
misrepresentation, and courts pierce the veil in almost all cases in which they find 
misrepresentation.” (footnote deleted). 
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of the creditors, who must incur greater expense “to ascertain the true 
creditworthiness of the corporations with which they deal,”
246
 or to 
situations where there are “misrepresentation[s] as to the corporation’s 
assets and financial condition, and misrepresentation[s] as to the party 
responsible for payment,”
247
 several observations are in order.  To begin 
with, Judge Posner’s concern with the fraudulent nature of misleading 
separate incorporation clearly applies to the Janus situation, if the 
allegations of the complaint are to be accepted:  “the creditor dealing with a 
group of affiliates in related businesses is more likely to be misled into 
thinking he is dealing with a single corporation [than would be the case 
were the affiliates engaged in unrelated businesses].”
248
  This accurately 
describes one of the misrepresentation-based problems in Janus, which 
might have justified veil-piercing on the grounds of fraud.  The argument is 
not that JCM controlled or dominated JIF to such an extent that veil-
piercing could be had under the alter ego, instrumentality, or identity 
theory, but rather that the conflation of these three entities (all dubbed 
“Janus”) in SEC filings and in the mutual fund prospectuses distributed to 
investors misled the investors into thinking they were dealing with JCM 
and that it was JCM, not JIF, that “made” the misrepresentations about 
market timing that ultimately injured the plaintiffs.
249
  Indeed, one of the 
plaintiffs’ strongest arguments was that the various Janus entities presented 
themselves to the public as a unitary bloc and that they were virtually (and 
fraudulently) indistinguishable.
250
  If these companies deliberately confused 
the public about exactly who and what constituted “Janus,” this confusion 
might well have provided the Court with a reasonable basis on which to 
pierce the veil.
251
  At the very least, given that veil-piercing is not available 
 
 246. Posner, supra note 245, at 520. 
 247. Thompson, supra note 240, at 1044 n.53. 
 248. Posner, supra note 245, at 514. 
 249. It should be borne in mind that problems which the plaintiffs in Janus might 
otherwise have had with the “in connection with” and loss causation requirements of their 
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cause of action are beyond the scope of this article.  These issues, 
as well as the reliance-attribution problem touched upon briefly above (see supra text 
accompanying notes 138–43), arise as a result of the fact that the plaintiffs did not purchase 
any of the mutual funds’ stock, but rather purchased stock only in JCG.  Failure to meet 
some or perhaps all of these other elements might well have proved fatal to the plaintiffs’ 
case in any event, and it is not here pretended otherwise. 
 250. Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 53. 
 251. One commentator has stated that when it comes to piercing the corporate veil on a 
fraud theory, “in most cases the misrepresentation is less than that required to recover under 
common-law fraud (or some codification of that rule of law).”  Thompson, supra note 240, 
at 1044 n.53.  Although the extent to which securities fraud incorporates or codifies 
principles of common-law fraud is a subject of some debate (see, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. 
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 149 (2008)), certainly common-law fraud 
principles were a relevant starting point for the 1933 and 1934 Congress that passed the 
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.  See LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
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in the case of public corporations, as noted earlier,
252
 such intentionally-
created public confusion among entities should have caused the Court to 
pause before breezily noting that “Janus” respected the separate existence 
of its constituent entities and observed all required corporate formalities. 
253
 
Yet this is not all.  Aside from the issue of whether JCM was 
responsible, at least in part, for any alleged misrepresentations about the 
separate corporate existence (or lack thereof) of JCG, JCM, and JIF, there 
was at least one other significant misrepresentation which, had  the Court 
applied the veil-piercing theory,  would potentially have made JCM liable.  
This resulted from the fact that the plaintiffs, bringing a securities fraud 
disclosure action, focused their attention on the deficiencies in the 
prospectuses with respect to market timing.  It has been observed that 
“[o]ne common ground for voiding an agreement
254
 is fraud.  Hence, . . . if 
the creditor can show that the defendant induced the creditor to do business 
with the corporation by making misrepresentations,
255
 this will be grounds 
to pierce.”
256
  Gevurtz’s CORPORATION LAW goes on to add that “it has 
become customary among both courts and commentators to state that fraud 
provides grounds to pierce.”
257
  Gevurtz notes that actionable 
misrepresentations include deceptive statements about a corporation’s 
financial status and misrepresentations which mislead the plaintiff into 
believing that someone other than the corporation whose veil the creditor 
seeks to pierce stands behind the obligation to the plaintiff.
258
  Additionally, 
 
SECURITIES REGULATION  1251–69 (6th ed. 2011). 
 252. Thompson, supra note 240, at 1039. 
 253. The element of ‘scienter’ is also beyond the scope of this article, yet a close 
distillation of the respondent’s brief gives the impression that the confusion created by the 
defendants’ use of the name ‘Janus’ to refer to all of JCG, JCM, and JIF was deliberate.  
Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 20. 
 254. The courts and commentators distinguish between contract creditors and tort 
creditors in veil-piercing cases, although the results do not necessarily vary all that much 
depending on which type of creditor is at issue.  See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 236, at 
124–25; FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 72–75 (2d ed. 2010).  One major 
difference is in the potential applicability of some sort of plaintiff’s “due diligence” 
requirement, which would apply to contract creditors but not to tort creditors.  See, e.g., 
Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 212–13 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 255. The veil-piercing doctrine provides a right of action to unpaid creditors of a closely-
held corporation, as opposed to the standard remedy available to shareholders of a 
corporation, namely a suit for breach of fiduciary duty.  The fact that the Janus case was 
brought by shareholders—and not even shareholders of the corporations that issued the 
misleading prospectuses (see supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text)—rather than by 
creditors is, of course, another reason why the plaintiffs did not pursue a veil-piercing action 
against JIF and JCM. 
 256. GEVURTZ, supra note 254, at 73–74. 
 257. Id. at 82. 
 258. Id. at 82–84.  These two types of misrepresentations may be deemed the functional 
equivalent of the kinds of actionable misrepresentation recognized by Judge Posner and 
mentioned earlier.  See Posner, supra note 245, at 514, 520–22. 
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Gevurtz points to a third, important type of misrepresentation that may also 
lead to veil-piercing:  “the possibility of finding fraud in statements made 
by the defendant in promising corporate performance.”
259
  In such a 
situation, since “promises contain within them an implied statement as to 
the speaker’s present intention with respect to performance. . .[,] [i]f the 
speaker never intended to perform, then this implied statement is false.”
260
  
Intriguingly, in what the reader might consider to be a prescient dismissal 
of the Janus Court’s fixation with the separate corporate existence issue, 
Gevurtz also notes that “the world might be more sensible if attorneys of 
small corporate clients spent less time urging compliance with corporate 
formalities, and more time suggesting care and candor in communicating 
with creditors.”
261
  That candor, of course, includes the obligation not to 
“make any untrue statement of material fact . . . .”
262
 
The relevance to the Janus case is apparent.  In making 
misrepresentations about its commitment to prevent market timing, Janus 
(including, as discussed above, JCM, the investment adviser to JIF), made 
an actionable misstatement dealing with corporate performance, namely 
that it would take adequate steps (i.e., would perform in a certain way in 
order) to stop market timing by any investors in its funds.
263
  Had plaintiffs 
been allowed to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage, they would 
have been required to show that at the time JCM made the reassuring 
statements in the prospectuses to the effect that market timing would not be 
tolerated, it had no intention of following through on the promised 
performance (namely, stamping out that market timing).
264
  Plaintiffs could 
have demonstrated this intention simply by the fact that JCM allowed 
certain hedge fund clients to engage in market timing in exchange for the 
hedge funds’ agreement to invest in other funds managed by the adviser.
265
  
Additionally, and this goes to one of the standard methods of proving the 
Rule 10b-5 element of reliance,
266
 a fraudulent basis for piercing the 
corporate veil can be found where the misrepresentations in question 
“induced the creditor to do business with the corporation.”
267
  A fair 
 
 259. GEVURTZ, supra note 254, at 83. 
 260. Id.  Again, it should be noted that the Rule 10b-5 element of scienter, the “intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud” (see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188 
(1976)), is beyond the scope of this article. 
 261. GEVURTZ, supra note 254, at 83. 
 262. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2010). 
 263. See supra text accompanying note 234. 
 264. Again, this can perhaps be best considered part of the unanalyzed scienter element 
of Rule 10b-5. 
 265. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 6–7. 
 266. A full analysis of this element is also beyond the scope of this article, as is anything 
other than the brief discussion of attribution in the context of reliance given above.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 138–43. 
 267. GEVURTZ, supra note 254, at 73–74. 
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reading of respondent’s brief is to the effect that the funds’ shareholders 
were induced, at least to some extent, to make their long-term investment 
in the funds relying on assurances in the prospectuses that they would not 
be thereby injured by the presence of short-term market timers whose 
actions would have deleterious effects on their interests, including dilution, 
increased management expenses, and the like.
268
  It is true, as noted above, 
that this reliance argument is complicated and may ultimately break down 
because of the fact that the actual plaintiffs purchased JCG stock and did 
not invest in the funds themselves.
269
  Yet, had the Janus plaintiffs been 
allowed to make their case, they might have been able to show that since 
the value of JCG stock depended primarily on the extent of JCM’s profits, 
generated by management fees, and since those management fees declined 
sharply when investors in JIF liquidated large amounts of their holdings 
after the truth about Janus’s actual market timing policy became known, 
they (the plaintiffs) were induced to purchase their JCG stock at least in 
part because of the misrepresentations about market timing.
270
  All that is 
argued here is that the equities for veil-piercing on the grounds of fraud 
appear to be present.  It is apparently easier to show “veil-piercing fraud” 
than it is to show the elements of common-law fraud or “some codification 
of” common-law fraud,
271
 such as the federal securities law.  Accordingly, 
the extent of connection between misrepresentations about the Janus funds 
and the purchase by the plaintiffs of JCG stock, rather than of mutual fund 
stock, should not stand as an insurmountable barrier to recovery on a veil-
piercing theory or some appropriate analogue thereto. 
It thus appears that the Supreme Court in Janus paid undue deference 
to the petitioners’ position that the Janus entities were separate entities that 
had adhered to corporate formalities, which led it, unfortunately, to 
“decline [the respondents’] invitation to disregard the corporate form.”
272
  
In so doing, however, the majority focused on the wrong theory.  The issue 
was not whether JCM and JIF constituted a “single economic entity,”
273
 or 
whether veil-piercing or some functional equivalent might have been 
appropriate on the basis of the “alter ego,” “instrumentality,” or “identity” 
rule.
274
  The whole premise of plaintiff’s case was fraud—material 
misrepresentations under the federal securities law.
275
  Fraud provides a 
 
 268. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 6. 
 269. See supra text accompanying notes 45–50. 
 270. In reality, such an argument would have probably foundered on the attenuation and 
remoteness problem noted by the court in Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 
U.S. 148, 159 (2008). 
 271. Thompson, supra note 240, at 1044 n.53. 
 272. Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011). 
 273. See Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1458 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 274. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 236, at 127. 
 275. Material misrepresentations constitute actionable deception (fraud) under the 
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long-recognized basis for veil-piercing apart from problems of control and 
domination or the extent of connection between the corporation whose veil 
is sought to be pierced and the person or entity on whom the plaintiff 
ultimately wishes to affix liability.
276
  It is unfortunate that the Janus Court 
failed to perceive the distinction and follow up on the true nature of the 
plaintiff’s claim.  But that, of course, might have required the Court to 
breathe new life into the endangered species known as the implied private 
right of action under Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 
10b-5.  And this the Court was obviously unwilling to do. 
C.  Who Is a “Maker”?: A Workable Test 
The Supreme Court in Janus could have chosen another way, a better 
way in the opinion of this author, which would have been a combination of 
a definition of “make” or “maker” and a test.  This approach has not been 
unheard-of, the Court having utilized it at least twice before in the 
securities field.
277
  This combination of definition and test would have 
focused on the “benefit” prong of Dirks v. SEC and Pinter v. Dahl.
278
  This  
would have kept the Court grounded in the actual language used by the 
SEC, while at the same time allowing the Court to screen out potential 
“makers” who were too far removed from the (mis)statements that were 
made. 
In the Dirks decision, the Court considered the potential liability of a 
tippee of an insider.
279
  The insider did not trade on the basis of, or obtain a 
personal benefit from the use of, the inside information which he imparted 
to the tippee, and neither did the tippee, Raymond Dirks.
280
  Rather, Dirks 
shared nonpublic negative information about the insider’s former company, 
Equity Funding of America, with his brokerage clients, who then sold their 
Equity Funding stock prior to public disclosure of the fraud, thereby 
avoiding substantial losses.
281
  The Supreme Court was apparently 
concerned about the SEC’s overzealousness in bringing an enforcement 
action against a party that had not traded and that had acquired the 
nonpublic information from an insider who also had not traded.  The Court 
 
holding of Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977).  See supra note 163. 
 276. See., e.g., Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1445, 1451 
(N.D. Ill. 1991):  “if the other party or persons associated with it, deceive you into thinking 
that you are dealing with a substantial enterprise, and not a mere shell, then the fiction of 
separate corporate existence does become an engine of fraud, and you can pierce the veil . . . 
fraud is independently actionable.” 
 277. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646. 
 280. Id.  at 666–67 n. 27. 
 281. Id. at 649. 
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reached a reasonable accommodation given these unusual facts, holding 
that a tippee will not be liable unless “the insider has breached his fiduciary 
duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the 
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.”
282
  More 
importantly for present purposes, the Court held that to show a breach of 
duty by a non-trading insider, “the test is whether the insider personally 
will benefit, directly or indirectly,
283
 from his disclosure.”
284
 
Pinter also involved the element of “benefit.” This case is perhaps 
more on point than Dirks because the justices in Pinter had to consider one 
of the definitions sections of the 1933 Securities Act.  In this later Supreme 
Court decision, purchasers of unregistered oil and gas interests, including 
Dahl, sued the seller (Pinter) for violations of Section 12 of the 1933 Act 
when their investment turned out to be unsuccessful.
285
  The defendant 
counterclaimed against Dahl, arguing that Dahl could be considered a 
“seller” under Section 12(a)(1), along with Pinter, because he had helped 
line up the other purchasers and had also helped them negotiate the 
purchase of their interests from Pinter.
286
  Dahl, in the defendant’s mind, 
had thereby “induced Pinter to sell and deliver the securities.”
287
  The 
Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine the meaning of the word 
“seller” and construe its potential application to Dahl. 
The Court rested its analysis partly on statutory language and partly on 
a benefit test.  After pointing out that Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act 
defines the terms “sale,” “sell,” and “offer,” among others, to include 
“every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a 
security or interest in a security, for value,”
288
 the Court held that the term 
“seller” includes not only those who pass title to a security, but also those 
who “solicit” a purchaser on behalf of the person who passes title.
289
  Yet 
 
 282. Id. at 660 (footnote deleted). 
 283. The Dirks case was decided by Justice Powell, a man not afraid to give meaning to 
the word “indirectly” when necessary.  By “indirect” benefit in this context, the Dirks Court 
suggested “a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”  Id. at 664.  A 
kickback from the actual trader to the insider, by contrast, might be considered a “direct” 
benefit. 
 284. Id. at 662. 
 285. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 626 (1988); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1) (2007).  
Section 12(a)(1) provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person who . . . offers or sells a 
security in violation of Section 5 . . . shall be liable  . . . to the person purchasing such 
security from him.”  Id.  Section 12 allows for rescission if a defendant “offers or sells a 
security in violation of Section 5” of the 1933 Act, the registration provision.  Id.; see also 
15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2007). 
 286. Id. at 628. 
 287. Id. Pinter also asserted a claim against Dahl for in pari delicto, which is irrelevant 
for present purposes.  See id. at n.6. 
 288. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2007). 
 289. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 646. 
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the Court was concerned about an overly expansive definition of “seller” or 
“solicitor,” and so it crafted a limitation on those terms which is highly 
pertinent to the Janus situation:  “Congress did not intend to impose 
rescission based on strict liability [under Section 12(a)(1)] on a person who 
urges the purchase but whose motivation is solely to benefit the buyer.”
290
  
As in Dirks, benefit was the key:  “[t]he language and purpose of § 
12[(a)](1) suggest that liability extends only to the person who successfully 
solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own 
financial interests or those of the securities owner.”
291
  Only such a person 
could be deemed, beyond the person who actually passes title, to be a 
Section 12(a)(1) “seller.”  The Court remanded the case so that the lower 
courts could determine whether “Dahl had the kind of interest in the sales 
that make him liable as a statutory seller . . . ,”
292
 i.e., whether he was 
motivated, at least in part, to benefit himself or Pinter. 
These two cases suggest a reasonable, workable test for who can be 
deemed a “maker” of a misstatement or omission under Rule 10b-5(b), a 
test which nicely reflects the realities of the Janus situation.  A “maker” 
would include not merely the actual person who issues the false statements 
(in this case JIF, who can be likened to the person who actually passed title 
in Pinter, namely Pinter himself), but also any other related
293
 party who, 
motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests, 
was in a position to promote or influence the creation and distribution of 
the misleading statements.  Under this test, JCM, and perhaps JCG as well, 
would be liable for violations of Rule 10b-5 arising out of the 
misstatements about market timing that appeared in the JIF prospectuses.  
As noted earlier,
294
 JCM had everything to gain from making sure that 
long-term investors in JIF never learned the truth about the market timing 
advantages conferred on the short-term traders, the hedge fund investors in 
JIF and in other funds managed by JCM,
295
 and everything to lose from 
 
 290. Id. at 647. 
 291. Id. (emphasis added).  The Court earlier framed one of the issues it had to decide as 
being “whether one must intend to confer a benefit on himself or on a third party in order to 
qualify as a seller within the meaning of § 12[(a)](1).”  Id. at 625.  The Court answered this 
question in the affirmative. 
 292. Id. at 654. 
 293. By “related,” in this context, this author means any other party who, by virtue of its 
connection to the party that actually makes the misstatements in question, is in a position to 
control or influence the creation, drafting, issuance, and/or dissemination of those 
misstatements.  This limiting principle should, but probably will not, satisfy the current 
Supreme Court. 
 294. See supra text accompanying note 33 (pointing out that when the truth did come 
out, the assets under management by JCM declined by $14 billion). 
 295. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 25, at 1, 5–6 (explaining that JCM told 
investors its mutual funds would not allow market-timing in order to induce greater long-
term investment, but at the same time allowed select hedge fund investors to engage in 
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disclosure of the truth.  The amount of JCM’s advisory fees depended on 
how much money it had under management.  According to the complaint, 
when the actual facts about JIF’s market timing policies became known and 
there was a run on the JIF funds, JCM’s income plummeted.
296
  It is hard to 
imagine a clearer example than this of a party who is motivated to hide 
material facts out of a concern for its own financial interests and welfare.  
Furthermore, under this suggested new test, it is clear that JCM, based on 
the close relationship it had with JIF and the extent of control it exercised 
over JIF as its investment advisor,
297
 was in an ideal position to influence 
the creation, content, and dissemination of the misstatements in question.  
Lest this be seen, however, as a simple rephrasing of the Supreme Court’s 
“ultimate authority” test and considered as this author’s mere disagreement 
with the Court as to who possessed that “ultimate authority,” it should be 
stressed that the critical element in the proposed test that was totally 
lacking in the Janus analysis is the focus on the benefit derived by JCM 
from JIF’s misstatements.
298
  The emphasis is not on the fact of “ultimate 
authority”; it is rather on the fact that, in order to hold an allegedly behind-
the-scenes party like JCM, Dahl, or Secrist
299
 liable for violations 
committed in the first instance by someone else, and still preserve the 
distinction between primary and aiding-and-abetting liability after Central 
Bank, the Court should consider both the reasons why that behind-the-
scenes party might have wanted to conceal the truth and also that party’s 
power and ability to keep the truth hidden.  When the problem is looked at 
in this light, it is clear that JCM was at least one of the “makers” of the 
misstatements in the JIF prospectuses.  And as such, JCM should have been 
 
market-timing at the expense of long-term investors in order to collect more in management 
and advisory fees). 
 296. Id. at 1. 
 297. Id. at 10. 
 298. This “motivational benefit” is not the same thing as the scienter element of Rule 
10b-5, which would be subject to the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA.  The 
level of proof necessary to show that the “maker,” here JCM, was motivated to keep its 
revenues artificially inflated by concealing the truth about JIF’s market timing policies is 
not as high as what the plaintiffs would have to show in order to survive a motion to dismiss 
for failure to adequately plead scienter.  See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2007) (“In any private action arising under this title in which the 
plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a 
particular state of mind, the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to 
violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind.”).  In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007), the Court construed the “strong inference” standard 
of the PSLRA to require, in a Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 action, the following:  “A complaint 
will survive, we hold, only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter 
cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts 
alleged.” (footnote omitted). 
 299. The non-trading insider in Dirks. 
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held liable under Rule 10b-5. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
If the implied private right of action under Securities Exchange Act 
Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 were a low-lying island,
300
 then 
securities plaintiffs would probably feel a lot like those who are helplessly 
watching the sea level rise around them as a result of global warming.  
Little by little the Supreme Court has chipped away at this well-recognized 
right, once the staunchest bulwark of defrauded plaintiffs against “[t]he evil 
that men do . . . .”
301
  Perhaps soon the right will no longer be able to keep 
its head above water as the tide of high Court cases restricting it (and lower 
court cases following in the Supreme Court’s footsteps
302
) rushes over it.  
 
 300. “No man is an island,” according to John Donne.  See Devotions upon Emergent 
Occasions, Meditation XVII, in JOHN DONNE, THE WORKS OF JOHN DONNE 574–75 (1839).  
This is the same essay that gave us the equally famous expression, “[f]or whom the bell 
[actually this bell] tolls . . . .”  Id. 
 301. Which, in the words of the dramatist, “lives after them.”  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2, l. 75.  The good, as we know, ends up in an ossuary.  Id. at act 
3, sc. 2, l. 76. 
 302. Cases construing the meaning and scope of Janus have quickly followed on the 
heels of the Supreme Court’s opinion.  Representative early decisions include, inter alia, the 
following:  In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative and “ERISA” Litig., 2011 WL 3444199 
(D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011) (distinguishing Janus and holding Merck’s Executive Vice President 
for Science and Technology and President of Merck Research Laboratories liable for 
violating Rule 10b-5 for product safety misrepresentations about Vioxx, partially on the 
grounds that, whereas in Janus the plaintiff had tried to hold one legal entity (JCM) liable 
for misrepresentations made by an entirely separate legal entity (JIF), here the plaintiff was 
simply attempting to hold liable a corporate officer of one entity only).  The court in Merck 
stated that the corporate official actually “made” the misrepresentations in question, since:  
[A]t the time of each attributed statement [he was] an officer of Merck.  He 
signed SEC forms and was quoted in articles and reports in his capacity as 
Merck’s Executive Vice President for Science and Technology and President of 
Merck Research Laboratories.  He made the statements pursuant to his 
responsibility and authority to act as an agent of Merck. 
Id. at *25.  The court decided, given these facts, that liability did not depend on whether the 
corporate official had “ultimate authority” over the statements at issue.  Id.; In re Textron, 
Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 2011 WL 4079085, at *6 (D.R.I. Sept. 13, 2011) (where 
only one director made allegedly misleading statements concerning the corporation’s 
backlog, he was “the only Director Defendant who can be held directly liable as a maker of 
the statements under Section 10(b)” (citing Janus); the court did not discuss the “ultimate 
authority” issue, perhaps because the main focus of the case was on whether pre-filing 
demand was excused under Aronson and Rales, the court concluding that demand was not 
excused because of the unlikelihood that the other directors would face any § 10(b) 
liability). 
  Other cases have considered the “ultimate authority” or “control” issue to be 
critical, however.  See Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, 2011 WL 3862206 
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011) (absolving defendant lower-level corporate officials, in the wake 
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The Janus case is simply the most recent wave to hit the eroding shoreline.  
Surely there will be more. 
This article has taken the position that the Court in Janus turned 
statutory analysis on its head in its determination to deny the plaintiff a 
remedy at all costs.  The Court’s willful slighting of the actual meaning of 
the word “make,” and its activist substitution of an artificial test of 
“ultimate authority” or “control” for a reasonable definition of the word, 
without any precedent to back up its approach, were unfounded measures 
which the facts did not justify.  Furthermore, the Court missed an 
opportunity to make clear to the securities industry that merely taking the 
requisite formal steps to establish and maintain separate entity status will 
not, and should not, protect those who are bent on defrauding others by 
their involvement in the “making” of material misstatements or omissions 
connected to a securities sale.  Finally, the article suggested a new test to 
decide who “makes” a misstatement, one that is based on the benefit 
analysis of the Court’s own earlier Dirks and Pinter opinions.  It is unlikely 
that this new test will move the Supreme Court, however.  For as long as at 
least five of the current justices remain ready, willing, and able, not to say 
eager, to slice off bigger and bigger chunks of the little remaining land 
shoring up the hapless securities plaintiff, without much if any prodding 
needed on the part of the defendants’ bar, the implied private right of action 
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 will be threatened with eventual 
submersion.  Let’s hope the plaintiff, whoever she is, knows how to swim. 
 
of Janus, largely on the grounds that these defendants had acted at the directive of 
management senior to them and had no discretion to refuse to engage in the production of 
misleading forecasts as to the corporation’s financial condition).  As a result, the court held 
that “[t]he complaint does not state a claim for primary liability under Janus, because the 
defendants did not have ultimate authority over the content of the statement.”  Id. at *5.  
Accord, Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93873, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011) (deeming defendants the 
“makers” of misstatements in Sarbanes-Oxley Act certifications accompanying the 
corporation’s SEC filings because they were “in ultimate authority over their statements”). 
